Ministry of Defence

All Written Answers – Trident, Defence, 27 January 2015

Paul Flynn (Newport West, Labour)

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, with reference to his statement of 20 January 2015, Official Report, column 105, on Trident renewal, that the UK has met its commitment to withdraw from deployment some of its nuclear weapons, whether an independent authority has been given access to verify that withdrawal of operational nuclear weapons; what his Department has done with those missiles withdrawn from deployment; what his Department has done with fissile material from those nuclear warheads withdrawn from deployment; and what international safeguards inspection measures have been applied to that fissile material.

Philip Dunne (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence; Ludlow, Conservative)

As a recognised Nuclear Weapons State under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the UK is not obliged to seek an independent authority to verify the reduction in the number of operational missiles and nuclear warheads.

Non-operational Trident missiles are stored in accordance with agreed procedures. The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review revision of the number of operational missiles did not change the UK entitlement to Trident missiles, which are supplied from a common pool in the US under a Government to Government arrangement.

Once processed, the fissile material from dismantled warheads is returned to the Ministry of Defence nuclear material stockpile.

As a recognised Nuclear Weapons State under the NPT, the UK is not obliged to place this material under international safeguards.

All Written Answers – Trident, Defence, 27 January 2015

Paul Flynn (Newport West, Labour)

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, with reference to the section on Barrow Infrastructure in the United Kingdom’s Future Nuclear Deterrent: 2014 Update to Parliament, how he calculated that £42 million would be saved by a different approach to financing the rebuild of new support facilites in the Central Yard at the Barrow shipyard; what the early implementation steel work to the New Assembly Shop consists of; and how the £55 million of planned expenditure for which no specific purpose is assigned will be used.

Philip Dunne (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence; Ludlow, Conservative)

The expected £42 million reduction in cost results from changes to the way the Department pays for the Barrow facility improvements. The payment changes reflect a move from overhead recovery from BAE Systems to direct funding by the Ministry of Defence, and an associated reduction in the company’s profit to reflect the reduced level of commercial risk.

Much of the plant and equipment within the new assembly shop will require upgrading and refurbishing from the existing stock to support the Successor submarine build programme. This includes presses, rotators and specialist welding equipment; the testing of this equipment will use steel from which test-pieces and prototypes will be manufactured.

The 2014 Update to Parliament explained that £261 million of funding has been re-profiled into the Assessment Phase. Of this, £206 million is to support Barrow infrastructure. The remaining £55 million is the £55 million referred to in the Long Lead Items section of the 2014 update.

All Written Ministerial Statements – Nuclear Deterrent Update, Defence, 18 December 2014

Michael Fallon (The Secretary of State for Defence; Sevenoaks, Conservative)
On 18 May 2011, the then Secretary of State for Defence, my right hon. Friend Dr Liam Fox made an oral statement to the House, Hansard, column 351, announcing the approval of the initial gate investment stage for the procurement of the successor submarines to the Vanguard-class SSBNs. He also placed in the Library of the House a report “The United Kingdom’s Future Nuclear Deterrent: The Submarine Initial Gate Parliamentary Report”.

This Government committed to publishing an annual report on the programme and I am today publishing the third report, “The United Kingdom’s Future Nuclear Deterrent: 2014 Update to Parliament”. A copy has been placed in the Library of the House.

All Written Answers – Nuclear Weapons, Defence, 18 December 2014

Paul Flynn (Newport West, Labour)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what evaluation his Department has made of the requirements for radioactive remediation and toxic materials clean up at the (a) uranium mines abroad from which the UK obtained the uranium used in military nuclear programmes and (b) sites where British nuclear warheads were tested in (i) Australia, (ii) Christmas Island and (iii) Nevada.

Michael Fallon (The Secretary of State for Defence; Sevenoaks, Conservative)
Holding answer received on 17 December 2014
The Ministry of Defence has made no such evaluation of uranium mines or sites in Nevada.

In 1993, following a report of the Australian Royal Commission on the conduct of nuclear tests in Australia, the UK Government made an ex gratia payment of £20 million to the Australian Government. This payment was part of a full and final settlement of the UK Government’s liability for any claims resulting from the British test programme.

The Ministry of Defence has made evaluations of residual contamination on Christmas Island: the last in 1998 concluded that any required remediation had been undertaken.

All Written Answers – Trident Submarines, Defence, 16 December 2014

Nicholas Soames (Mid Sussex, Conservative)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what potential suppliers to the VANGUARD replacement programme his Department has identified.

Julian Brazier (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of Stte for Defence; Canterbury, Conservative)
Holding answer received on 16 December 2014
The key suppliers for the Successor submarine programme are BAE Systems, Rolls-Royce, Babcock and the US Government.

These suppliers are responsible for the selection of individual sub-contractors.

All Written Answers – Nuclear Weapons: Transport, Defence, 15 December 2014

Paul Flynn (Newport West, Labour)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what reports his Department’s Nuclear Accident and Response Organisation has produced on accidents involving the (a) road transport, (b) air transport and (c) sea shipment of nuclear weapons within, into and from the UK in the last 30 years; and if he will publish those reports on his Department’s website.

Philip Dunne (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence; Ludlow, Conservative)
Definitions of the term accident have evolved over time but the term is not currently used by the MOD for nuclear weapons transportation. The nearest current equivalent is ‘a Safety Alert’, which is defined (in the Joint Services Publication 471) as “An abnormal event which poses a potential threat to, or causes serious concern for reactor plant, nuclear weapon, or special nuclear material safety.”

Based on the definitions used since 1984, there has been one accident involving a nuclear weapon during a movement by road. This involved a WE177 weapon and occurred in 1987.

The reports on this accident are already in the public domain having been released following a Freedom of Information request in 2007. These can be found on the version of the MOD website archived for preservation by The National Archives via the following links:

http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121026065214/http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/FreedomOfInformation/DisclosureLog/SearchDisclosureLog/VariousIncidentsInvolvingNuclearWeaponsJanuary1987InWiltshire.htm

http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070905140554/http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/BoardsOfInquiry/BoardOfInquiryIntoTheWestDeanIncident.htm

There have been no air transport or sea shipment accidents.

In 1987 responsibility for the transportation of nuclear weapons resided with the RAF which produced the reports, rather than the DE&S Strategic Weapons Project Team’s Nuclear Accident Response Organisation (now called the Nuclear Emergency Organisation).

All Written Answers – Trident, Defence, 10 December 2014

Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North, Labour)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what the titles and dates of publication are of all reports held by the Government on the impact of the detonation of a UK Trident warhead.

Philip Dunne (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence; Ludlow, Conservative)
Further to my answer of 10 Sep 2014, (Official Report, column 618W), a number of reports were identified that relate to the impact of the detonation of a UK Trident warhead. This information is, however, being withheld to safeguard national security, because its release would prejudice the defence of the UK, and because it relates to the formulation of Government policy.

20140910 – Hansard extract (Word Document, 27.5 KB)

All Written Answers – Procurement, Defence, 5 December 2014

Nicholas Soames (Mid Sussex, Conservative)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what the date was of (a) initial gate, (b) main gate and (c) contract signature was for the (i) A400M Training Service, (ii) Airseeker, (iii) Brimstone 2, (iv) Beyond Visual Range Air to Air Missile on Lightning II, (v) Common Missile Compartment, (vi) Core Production Capability, (vii) Crypto Enabling Services and (viii) De-Equip, Defuel and Layup Preparations Facility projects.

Nicholas Soames (Mid Sussex, Conservative)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what the date was of (a) initial gate, (b) main gate and (c) contract signature was for the (i) GRAPEVINE 2, (ii) Joint Combat Aircraft – Production Sustainment and Follow On Development phase, (iii) Land Environment Tactical Communications and Information Systems, (iv) Typhoon Meteor Integration, (v) MARSHALL, (vi) Merlin Life Sustainment Programme, (vii) Mine countermeasure, Hydrographic and Patrol Capability and (viii) Mode 5 Identification Friend and Foe projects.

Nicholas Soames (Mid Sussex, Conservative)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what the date was of (a) initial gate, (b) main gate and (c) contract signature was for the (i) Next Generation Nuclear Propulsion Plant, (ii) Scavenger, (iii) Scout SV, (iv) SPEAR Capability 3, (v) Short Range Anti Air Missile Sustainment, (vi) Stormshadow integration on Typhoon, (vii) Submarine Dismantling Project and (viii) Successor projects.

Nicholas Soames (Mid Sussex, Conservative)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what the date was of (a) initial gate, (b) main gate and (c) contract signature was for the (i) Defence Core Network Services – GRAPEVINE, (ii) Defence Information Infrastructure Increment 2C, (iii) E-Purchasing, (iv) Future Local Area Aid Defence System (FLAADS) (Maritime) – T23, (v) FLAADS (Land), (vi) Future Anti-Surface Guided Weapon Heavy, (vii) Future Anti-Surface Guided Weapon – Light and (viii) Ground Based Aid Defence – Falkland Islands projects.

Philip Dunne (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence; Ludlow, Conservative)
The dates for Initial Gate and, where completed, Main Gate and contract signature for each of the programmes and projects listed are provided in the attached table.

The contract signature date has been taken to refer to a post-Main Gate manufacture phase contract. Contract signature dates for any contracts let earlier in the Concept, Assessment, Development, Manufacturing, In-Service and Disposal (CADMID) cycle, such as those for Assessment or Demonstration phases, or contracts let for Long Lead items, have not been included. However, for those programmes where the information requested is not complete, a note on their current status has been provided.

Programmes and Projects Lists (Word Document, 72 KB)

All Written Answers – Submarines, Defence, 3 December 2014

Angus Robertson (SNP Westminster Leader; Moray, Scottish National Party)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what fires have taken place on UK (a) nuclear-powered and (b) nuclear-armed submarines since 3 July 2012; and how many such fires were aboard HMS Talent and HMS Triumph.

Philip Dunne (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence; Ludlow, Conservative)
Due to the nature of submarine operations, meticulous records are kept of all fire safety incidents, irrespective of how minor.

Since 3 July 2012 there have been 14 small-scale fires, that were categorised as minor, including one on HMS TRIUMPH. They were dealt with quickly and effectively using on board resources.

All Written Answers – Nuclear Submarines, Defence, 2 December 2014

Angus Robertson (SNP Westminster Leader; Moray, Scottish National Party)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, if he will estimate the potential cost of procuring (a) 12, (b) 32 and (c) 48 Trident II D5 missile tubes for the Successor submarines.

Paul Flynn (Newport West, Labour)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what contracts have been placed for launch tubes for sea-launched Trident nuclear missiles with General Dynamics Electric Boat Company in the US.

Philip Dunne (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence; Ludlow, Conservative)
Holding answer received on 27 November 2014
The missile tubes for the Successor Programme are being procured as part of the collaborative Common Missile Compartment (CMC) project with the US. General Dynamics Electric Boat has been awarded an $83.8 million contract modification by the US Department of Defense to continue development of the CMC.

The contract provides funding for 17 missile tubes; four for the US submarine programme, one for a US shore test facility and 12 missile tubes for the Successor Programme. The 12 UK missile tubes’ share of this contract is estimated at $59 million. Costs beyond the first 17 tubes have yet to be agreed, and it would prejudice commercial interests to estimate costs at this stage. The Ministry of Defence is not planning to commit to further missile tubes prior to Main Gate in 2016.

All Written Answers – Nuclear Submarines, Defence, 1 December 2014

Angus Robertson (SNP Westminster Leader; Moray, Scottish National Party)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, when HMS Talent and HMS Triumph will be based at HMNB Clyde; and when and where those vessels will be decommissioned.

Philip Dunne (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence; Ludlow, Conservative)
HMS TALENT and HMS TRIUMPH will move to Her Majesty’s Naval Base (HMNB) Clyde in 2019 and 2020 respectively.

On current plans the end of service date for TALENT is 2021; for TRIUMPH it is 2022. The intention is that the decommissioning ceremonies for both submarines will take place in HMNB Clyde.

All Written Answers – Nuclear Submarines, Defence, 27 November 2014

Angus Robertson (SNP Westminster Leader; Moray, Scottish National Party)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, if he will estimate the potential cost of procuring (a) 12, (b) 32 and (c) 48 Trident II D5 missile tubes for the Successor submarines.

Philip Dunne (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence; Ludlow, Conservative)
The Ministry of Defence has indicated that it will not be possible to answer this question within the usual time period. An answer is being prepared and will be provided as soon as it is available.

All Written Answers – Nuclear Submarines, Defence, 27 November 2014

Angus Robertson (SNP Westminster Leader; Moray, Scottish National Party)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, whether the Successor submarine will have 12 missile tubes; whether those submarines will be sent on patrol filled with 12 missiles; whether those submarines will be armed with nuclear warheads; and whether those submarines can set sail with empty missile tubes.

Angus Robertson (SNP Westminster Leader; Moray, Scottish National Party)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, with reference to page 5 of the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review, what the saving was to the public purse of reducing the number of operational launch tubes on submarines to eight during the spending review period; and whether the £3.2 billion saving in the 10 years from 2010 was contingent on each Successor submarine having eight missile tubes armed with eight Trident D5 II missiles armed with 40 warheads.

Philip Dunne (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence; Ludlow, Conservative)
The Successor submarine will be based on a 12-tube common missile compartment, but as stated in the 2010 Strategic Defence & Security Review (SDSR), it will be configured with only eight operational missiles, delivering a maximum of 40 nuclear warheads spread over these missiles. The submarines can sail with some tubes that are not configured with missiles. Such tubes would be configured with ballast cans to enable the submarine to dive.

There were no savings associated with reducing the number of operational launch tubes on Successor to eight, as it remained the case that the best value for money solution was the 12-tube missile compartment design.

The 2010 Trident Value for Money Review identified £3.2 billion of savings and deferrals over the next 10 years. These included the impact of reducing the cost of the submarine’s missile compartment, resulting from an agreement with the US over the likely dimensions of the missile tubes (with consequent savings in predicted infrastructure changes) and the impact of a reduction in the overall UK warhead stockpile.

All Written Answers – Nuclear Submarines, Defence, 27 November 2014

Angus Robertson (SNP Westminster Leader; Moray, Scottish National Party)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, how much his Department has spent on each long lead item for the Successor submarine; and how much his Department has spent on the Successor submarine programme to date.

Philip Dunne (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence; Ludlow, Conservative)
The Ministry of Defence has indicated that it will not be possible to answer this question within the usual time period. An answer is being prepared and will be provided as soon as it is available.

All Written Answers – AWE Aldermaston, Defence, 26 November 2014

Paul Flynn (Newport West, Labour)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, with reference to page Ev 94 of Attachment 1 to the written evidence submitted by the British Pugwash Group, in the Sixth Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 2009-10, Global Security: UK-US relations, HC 114, on what occasions and for what purposes US nuclear weapons laboratories have used experimental facilities at the UK Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston to conduct tests that were prohibited in the US.

Philip Dunne (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence; Ludlow, Conservative)
None. Under the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement, joint UK/US experiments have been carried out using facilities at the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston to ensure the continued safety, security, and performance of UK and US nuclear warhead stockpiles; these experiments would not have been prohibited in the US.

All Written Answers – Trident, Defence, 25 November 2014

Vernon Coaker (Shadow Secretary of State for Defence; Gedling, Labour)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what steps his Department takes to monitor the safety and performance of the UK’s nuclear deterrent and weapons programme.

Michael Fallon (The Secretary of State for Defence; Sevenoaks, Conservative)
Holding answer received on 25 November 2014
Safety is monitored and regulated by the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator, the Defence Maritime Regulator and by civil regulators. Deterrent performance is assured by the Chief Strategic Systems Executive. The Defence Nuclear Safety Committee provides overarching assurance to the Secretary of State on the adequacy of these arrangements.

All Written Answers – Navy, Defence, 10 November 2014

Jim Shannon (Shadow DUP Spokesperson (Health); Strangford, DUP)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what steps his Department is taking to encourage school and college students to become submariners.

Anna Soubry (The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence; Broxtowe, Conservative)
When invited, the Armed Forces visit schools or colleges to support the school curriculum; to improve the awareness of their role and the range of career opportunities across the Armed Forces, including those unique to the Submarine Service such as nuclear engineering, and to pass on valuable skills such as leadership, teamwork and citizenship. In addition, the Royal Navy has established affiliations with four University Technical Colleges specialising in engineering and technical subjects. Under these affiliations, and it is hoped that more will follow, the Royal Navy will provide engineering expertise to assist with student projects and provide key note speakers.

Information on the Armed Forces in Britain and abroad, including their role, history, current operations and what it is like to work as part of the Royal Navy, Army and Royal Air Force, is also available to schools and colleges through the British Armed Forces Learning Resource 2014.

All Written Answers – Radioactive Weapons, Defence, 3 November 2014

Paul Flynn (Newport West, Labour)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what steps have been taken by the Scientific Advisory Group on Emergencies to implement recommendations arising from the 2011 Exercise Senator on nuclear accident emergencies.

Philip Dunne (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence; Ludlow, Conservative)
The Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) is convened only during an emergency, to coordinate and conduct peer reviews of scientific and technical advice in order to inform decision-making at the cross Government, national level.

National level recommendations and lessons identified from Ministry of Defence nuclear accident exercises such as SENATOR 2011, including any related to the SAGE, are drawn up through the Department of Energy and Climate Change-led Nuclear Emergency Planning and Response Programme.

All Written Answers – Radioactive Materials, Defence, 3 November 2014

Angus Robertson (SNP Westminster Leader; Moray, Scottish National Party)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, how many nuclear safety events there were at HMNB Clyde and RNAD Coulport involving (a) Class A and (b) Class B incidents involving (i) nuclear propulsion and (ii) nuclear weapons; and what the details were of each such incident.

Philip Dunne (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence; Ludlow, Conservative)
The Ministry of Defence has indicated that it will not be possible to answer this question within the usual time period. An answer is being prepared and will be provided as soon as it is available.

All Written Answers -Trident Submarines, Defence, 23 October 2014

Nicholas Soames (Mid Sussex, Conservative)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what the crew complement by (a) rank and (b) specialisation is of Vanguard class submarines.

Mark Francois (The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence; Rayleigh and Wickford, Conservative)
The Ministry of Defence has indicated that it will not be possible to answer this question within the usual time period. An answer is being prepared and will be provided as soon as it is available.

All Written Answers – USA, Defence, 21 October 2014

Angus Robertson (SNP Westminster Leader; Moray, Scottish National Party)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what the titles and objectives are of all enhanced collaborations under way under the auspices of the UK-US Mutual Defence Agreement.

Philip Dunne (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence; Ludlow, Conservative)
The 1958 UK-US Mutual Defence Agreement is a bilateral treaty which provides the basis of the UK’s relationship with the US in respect of nuclear propulsion and nuclear warheads.

Most of the activity carried out under the treaty comprises exchanging information, which takes place through a series of joint working groups.

In addition, there are two enhanced collaborations, which are focused on developing capabilities:

Enhanced Nuclear Safety – the objective of which is to develop architectures and technologies related to warhead safety.

Warhead Electrical System – the objective of which is to develop architectures and technologies related to warhead electrical systems.

Both enhanced collaborations contribute to ensuring that the UK maintains our nuclear warhead stockpile on a continuing basis.

All Written Ministerial Statements – Submarine Dismantling Project, Defence, 16 October 2014

Philip Dunne (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence; Ludlow, Conservative)
I am announcing today that the Ministry of Defence’s submarine dismantling project (SDP) has published the final shortlist of candidate sites for the storage of intermediate-level radioactive waste removed from nuclear-powered submarines after they have left naval service and been defuelled. The storage will be for an interim period until the UK’s geological disposal facility is available some time after 2040. I am also announcing that public consultation on the storage sites will begin on 14 November 2014.

The provisional shortlist I announced on 13 February 2014, Hansard, column 70WS, was as follows: the atomic weapons establishment sites at Aldermaston and Burghfield in Berkshire, which are owned by the MOD and run by AWE plc; Sellafield in Cumbria and Chapelcross in Dumfriesshire, which are owned by the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority; and Capenhurst in Cheshire, which is run by Capenhurst Nuclear Services.

We have now completed a period of pre-engagement with local authorities, elected representatives and established site stakeholder groups around each of the shortlisted sites. This provided these groups with an early opportunity to understand and comment on the criteria that should be considered during the main assessment of shortlisted sites. It is also helping to shape plans for the formal public consultation that we will carry out before any decisions are made.

The assessment process considers:

Whole life costs for each site.

Operational effectiveness of the site.

A strategic environmental assessment (SEA).

The project schedule proposed by the site owner.

Other contributory factors such as anticipated public opinion, policy and planningin each area.

Today we have published the final shortlist of sites. This is unchanged from the provisional list. Our analysis has not presented any grounds for discounting any of the sites at this stage.

This final shortlist will be taken forward as the basis for detailed assessment including public consultation, which will be carried out locally around each candidate site, as well as nationally.

Public consultation will begin on 14 November 2014 and end on 20 February 2015. This will take the form of public meetings and engagement alongside a wealth of information being put into the public domain to aid stakeholders’ understanding of the project.

Further information on the SDP can be found at:

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/submarine-dismantling-project-interim-storage-of-intermediate-level-radioactive-waste

All Written Answers – Trident, Defence, 15 October 2014

Angus Robertson (SNP Westminster Leader; Moray, Scottish National Party)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, with reference to the Answer of 14 January 2013, Official Report, column 601W, on Trident, how much his Department has spent to date on studies of whether to refurbish or replace the existing Trident warhead design.

Philip Dunne (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence; Ludlow, Conservative)
The total spent on studies to inform the decision on whether to refurbish or replace the existing warhead during the period until 30 September 2014 comprises £72.9 million on technology studies to support refurbishment of the current system and explore options for a potential future warhead; and £4.6 million on studies to support the decision whether to refurbish or replace the existing warhead

All Written Answers – Ukraine, Defence, 13 October 2014

Paul Flynn (Newport West, Labour)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what the value of financial assistance to the government of Ukraine for the improvement of its command, control and communication capabilities was in the last five years.

Paul Flynn (Newport West, Labour)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, how many UK (a) armed forces and (b) civilian personnel have been deployed to assist the government of Ukraine with the improvement of its command, control and communication capabilities in the last three years.

Mark Francois (The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence; Rayleigh and Wickford, Conservative)
Since April 2009 the Ministry of Defence (MOD) has spent approximately £3.9 million supporting Ukraine through the Defence Assistance Fund and the Conflict Pool. Many of the activities funded through these mechanisms support command, control and communications capabilities (C3), to a greater or lesser extent, including through the provision of joint exercising, military education and contributions to NATO coordinated activities. However, the MOD is unable to breakdown this cost further to provide a figure for financial assistance specifically related to C3 alone.

Activities highlighted included the deployment of both UK civilian and military personnel to Ukraine and Ukrainian personnel to the UK. One such example from September of this year was the deployment of 41 personnel from the Light Dragoons to Ukraine to take part in EXERCISE RAPID TRIDENT, an annual US/Ukrainian multinational exercise aimed at enhancing interoperability and strengthening NATO partnerships. Elements of such exercise activity play an important role in practising C3 capabilities, but we are not able to give a figure for the number of personnel that have been deployed to Ukraine specifically for C3.

At the NATO Summit in Wales, we announced that the UK would lead a NATO C4 (Command, Control, Communications and Computers) Trust Fund for Ukraine and will contribute over €400,000 to this initiative. Work is now under way on the implementation of the Trust Fund.

All Written Ministerial Statements – Defence Nuclear Safety Committee and Nuclear Research Advisory Council (Triennial Reviews), Defence, 13 October 2014

Michael Fallon (The Secretary of State for Defence; Sevenoaks, Conservative)
I am today announcing the publication by the Ministry of Defence of the findings of the triennial reviews of the Defence Nuclear Safety Committee (DNSC) and the Nuclear Research Advisory Council (NRAC). Triennial reviews are part of the Government’s commitment to ensuring that non departmental public bodies (NDPBs) continue to have regular independent challenge and to improving the accountability and effectiveness of public bodies.

The DNSC’s remit includes all safety aspects relating to the naval nuclear propulsion plant and nuclear weapon systems, including related issues of design, development, manufacture, storage, in-service support, handling, transport, operational training, support facilities and capabilities, and the safety of workers and the public.

The NRAC is responsible for reviewing the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) nuclear warhead research and capability maintenance programme, including the requirement for above-ground experiments and other facilities and techniques necessary to develop and maintain a UK nuclear weapon capability in the absence of underground testing; NRAC also examines AWE’s programme of international collaboration.

The reviews concluded that DNSC and NRAC not only provide a valuable source of independent advice, but that they also undertake a vital challenge function on behalf of the Government, and that both bodies should be retained as advisory NDPBs. The reviews also noted that the terms of reference and governance arrangements for both bodies are entirely appropriate.

The reviews also looked closely at the option of merging the two bodies, but concluded that, although their scope is complementary, they do examine different aspects of the deterrent programme, and that there would be no advantage in merging the two.

The review was carried out with the participation of a wide range of internal and external stakeholders and I am grateful to all those who contributed to these triennial reviews.

The Triennial Review Report: Nuclear Research Advisory Council (NRAC) and Defence Nuclear Safety Committee (DNSC) has been placed in the Library of the House. It is also available at:

https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/nuclear-research-advisory-council

and

https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/defence-nuclear-safety-committee

All Written Answers – Nuclear Weapons, Defence, 10 September 2014

Paul Flynn (Newport West, Labour)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the answers of 3 July 2014, Official Report, column 725W, on nuclear weapons and of 10 July 2014, Official Report, column 358W, on nuclear weapons, if he will publish the titles of reports requested for the longest most recent period of time that will not incur disproportionate cost.

Philip Dunne (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence; Ludlow, Conservative)
Responsibility for the transportation of warheads was transferred to the Warship Support Agency (now part of Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S)) from the RAF in 2002. Titles of reports that relate to the risks of the transport of nuclear warheads that are held by DE&S are shown below. To conduct a search of the archived files held by the RAF could be carried out only at disproportionate cost.

Threat Vulnerability Assessment/Peer Review dated 14 April 2014.

Review of security arrangements across Nuclear Weapon Lifecycle Phases (LCP) 1-3, dated 18 July 2012.

(Project Armoured Nuclear Transporter) Truck Cargo Heavy Duty Mk3 Transport Operational Safety Case (OSC) Issue 2 dated October 2011.

Nuclear Weapons Security—Op DANSK Final Report dated 29 April 2010.

The Future Role of the Ministry of Defence Police (known as The Woolley Report) 3 September 2009.

Transport and Base Security Study dated 8 May 2006.

Operational Safety Case for the Transport of Nuclear Weapons, Issue 2 dated January 2005.

Director Nuclear Movements and Nuclear Accident Response Group Safety Statement for the Modification of the Nuclear Weapon Convoy task to Continuous Running including running in the hours of darkness dated 16 December 2004.

Review of Nuclear Weapon Road Convoy Security Arrangements, by Brig J H Thomas dated 19 February 2003.

Movements by Sea of Nuclear Weapons dated 17 December 1996.

Management Services Organisation Study No. 774 Nuclear Road Convoys, dated October 1993.

A number of reports have been identified that relate to the effects of the use of a UK nuclear weapon, where the titles could be provided without incurring disproportionate cost. This information is, however, being withheld to safeguard national security, because its release would prejudice the defence of the UK, and because it relates to the formulation of Government policy.

All Written Answers – Nuclear Weapons, Defence, 8 September 2014

Paul Flynn (Newport West, Labour)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence

(1) how many nuclear warheads have been (a) lost and (b) lost and not recovered by NATO in the last 30 years;

(2) if he will provide details of each accident involving a nuclear weapon deployed outside of the US in support of NATO in the last 30 years.

Julian Brazier (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of Stte for Defence; Canterbury, Conservative)
The UK does not hold such information as it pertains to the Alliance as a whole.

Written Answers to Questions – Nuclear Weapons, Defence, 21 July 2014

Angus Robertson (SNP Westminster Leader; Moray, Scottish National Party)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how much of the funding allocated in the Defence and Equipment Plan 2013 for the procurement of new equipment will be spent on the successor nuclear deterrent programme and any redesign of the nuclear warhead.

Philip Dunne (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence; Ludlow, Conservative)
Of the £64.5 billion referred to in the 2013 Equipment Plan we plan to allocate to the procurement of new equipment, £2.3 billion is for the successor nuclear deterrent programme in the period up to Main Gate in 2016, when a future investment decision will be made. The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review determined that a replacement warhead would not be required until at least the late 2030s, meaning a decision to replace the existing warhead will not be required until the next Parliament. In the meantime, we are maintaining the capability at the Atomic Weapons Establishment to design a replacement warhead should that be required. Current forecasts indicate that costs should remain within the 2006 White Paper estimate: £11 billion-£14 billion for the submarine and £2 billion-£3 billion for the warhead (at 2006 economic conditions).

Written Answers to Questions – Trident, Defence, 21 July 2014

Sandra Osborne (Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock, Labour)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the annual cost to the public purse is of retaining and basing the nuclear deterrent at Faslane and Coulport.

Philip Dunne (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence; Ludlow, Conservative)
The cost of retaining the nuclear deterrent at Faslane and Coulport cannot be separately identified from expenditure incurred for multiple activities at Her Majesty’s Naval Base Clyde.

Written Answers to Questions – Trident Missiles, Defence, 21 July 2014

Angus Robertson (SNP Westminster Leader; Moray, Scottish National Party)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how much his Department will spend on the D-5 missile life extension programme in each of the next five years.

Philip Dunne (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence; Ludlow, Conservative)
Forecast and planned expenditure on the D5 missile life extension programme for the current and next financial years (FY) are as follows:

FY 2014-15-£27.1 million (Forecast)

FY 2015-16-£35.0 million (Planned)

Spending plans for 2016-17 and beyond have not yet been agreed and will be set as part of the Government’s spending review process. Therefore, I am withholding details of the proposed spending beyond 2015-16 as to release this information would be likely to impact upon the formulation of Government policy

Written Answers to Questions – Trident, Defence, 21 July 2014

Sandra Osborne (Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock, Labour)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what assessment he has made of the cost to the public purse of the removal of Trident from Scotland.

Julian Brazier (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of Stte for Defence; Canterbury, Conservative)
The UK Government has no plans to move the strategic nuclear deterrent from Her Majesty’s Naval Base Clyde, and has not considered options for moving the deterrent. Any alternative solution would come at huge cost to the taxpayer.

Oral Answers to Questions – Nuclear Deterrent, Defence, 14 July 2014

Priti Patel (Witham, Conservative)
What his policy is on the future of the UK’s nuclear deterrent.

Philip Hammond (The Secretary of State for Defence; Runnymede and Weybridge, Conservative)
Government policy remains as set out in the 2010 strategic defence and security review: we will maintain a continuous submarine-based deterrent and are proceeding with the programme to replace our existing submarines.

Priti Patel (Witham, Conservative)
Given the potential threats from hostile regimes around the world, I have heard what the Secretary of State has already had to say. Does he agree, however, that any surrender of our deterrent would not only leave us vulnerable but weaken our position as a permanent member of the UN Security Council?

Philip Hammond (The Secretary of State for Defence; Runnymede and Weybridge, Conservative)
My hon. Friend is exactly right, although of course we maintain our strategic deterrent as the ultimate guarantee of our sovereignty and independence of action. It is worth remembering that there are still 17,000 nuclear weapons in the world, and so long as that is the case, we must be able to protect the British people against them.

John Bercow (Speaker)
As Angus Robertson just had the finger rather distinctly pointed at him, I rather thought that he might be pricked into responding.

Angus Robertson (SNP Westminster Leader; Moray, Scottish National Party)
indicated dissent.

John Bercow (Speaker)
It appears not. Never mind, he is a model of calm and patience. We will move on—I think we will get Sir Peter Luff in.

Oral Answers to Questions – Trident Commission, Defence, 14 July 2014

Henry Smith (Crawley, Conservative)
What assessment he has made of the recommendations of the concluding report of the Trident commission set up by the British American Security Information Council.

Philip Hammond (The Secretary of State for Defence; Runnymede and Weybridge, Conservative)
I welcome the commission’s conclusion that while there remains the possibility of a direct nuclear threat to the UK, we should retain our nuclear deterrent. We are clear that for this to be effective we need to retain a continuous at-sea deterrent posture, as we have for the past 46 years.

Henry Smith (Crawley, Conservative)
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for that answer, with which I wholeheartedly agree. Will he confirm that the British American Security Information Council Trident commission report did not consider a two-boat solution?

Philip Hammond (The Secretary of State for Defence; Runnymede and Weybridge, Conservative)
My hon. Friend makes a very good point. There have been suggestions that, to save a relatively small sum of money, Britain should abandon continuous at-sea deterrence and opt for a part-time deterrent, with boats tied up alongside or even sent to sea without nuclear weapons on board. I can assure my hon. Friend that the Government firmly reject such advice and I can further assure him that a Conservative Government will never take risks with Britain’s strategic security.

John Bercow (Speaker)
Time for the good doctor. I call Dr Julian Lewis.

Julian Lewis (New Forest East, Conservative)
In welcoming what the Secretary of State for Defence has said, may I remind him that those on the Labour Front Bench have similarly committed to the retention of Trident and continuous at-sea nuclear deterrence? Does he therefore agree with me that whatever the complexion of the next Government, there can be no possible excuse for failing to renew Trident—whether in coalition, in government or in opposition? Wherever we are, we all ought to be committing to renewal in the next Parliament.

Philip Hammond (The Secretary of State for Defence; Runnymede and Weybridge, Conservative)
I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend that there is no possible excuse for not doing something that is absolutely necessary to Britain’s long-term strategic protection. However, I note that there are two parties represented in the Chamber this afternoon that do not support that agenda.

Written Answers – Nuclear Weapons, Defence, 10 July 2014

Paul Flynn (Newport West, Labour)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will publish the titles of all reports on the risks of the transport of nuclear warheads (a) within the UK and (b) from or to the UK from abroad produced for his Department by (i) his Department and (ii) the Atomic Weapons Establishment and its predecessor body in the last 30 years.

Philip Dunne (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence; Ludlow, Conservative)
The information is not held centrally and could be provided only at disproportionate cost.

Written Answers – Clyde Naval Base, Defence, 9 July 2014

Paul Flynn (Newport West, Labour)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence for what reasons the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State and Minister for International Security Strategy approved the proposals to limit contractor liability at HMNB Clyde to £100,000 despite the objection by the hon. Member for Newport West.

Andrew Murrison (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence; South West Wiltshire, Conservative)
Having considered the objection raised I decided to proceed with the Treasury Minute on Contingent Liability as this work is an essential enabler in allowing the Ministry of Defence (MOD) to deliver its projects and estate maintenance requirements on estates where nuclear assets are sited.

It is the MOD’S intent to limit the contractor’s liability at Her Majesty’s Naval Base Clyde to £100,000. Since no commercial contractor could reasonably be expected to assume total liabilities or to be able to insure against them, such a liability can only be borne by the state.

Written Answers – Procurement, Defence, 9 July 2014

Angus Robertson (SNP Westminster Leader; Moray, Scottish National Party)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence with reference to the £72.3 billion allocated in the Defence and Equipment Plan 2013 supporting existing in-service equipment, how much of that allocation is devoted to (a) nuclear propulsion and (b) nuclear weapons.

Philip Dunne (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence; Ludlow, Conservative)
Of the £72.3 billion referred to in the 2013 Equipment Plan we plan to allocate to the support of in-service equipment over the next decade, £1.6 billion is for nuclear propulsion and £13.0 billion for maintaining the Trident Strategic Weapons System, including costs associated with the nuclear warhead.

Written Answers – Submarines, Defence, 3 July 2014

Angus Robertson (SNP Westminster Leader; Moray, Scottish National Party)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether the Weapon Handling and Launch support contract includes an obligation on the contractor to provide waterfront support in the loading and unloading of (a) conventional and (b) nuclear weapons in (i) the UK and (ii) abroad.

Philip Dunne (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence; Ludlow, Conservative)
The Weapon Handling and Launch System (WHLS) support contract provides technical and logistic support for all WHLS equipment on Royal Navy submarines and at Royal Navy training establishments, including Weapon Embarkation Equipment (WEE). The actual use of WEE to load and unload conventional weapons in the UK and abroad is covered by separate commercial arrangements. The WHLS support contract is not used for any aspect of nuclear weapons.

Written Answers – Nuclear Weapons, Defence, 3 July 2014

Paul Flynn (Newport West, Labour)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will publish the titles of all reports covering the effects of the use of a UK nuclear weapon produced by (a) his Department and (b) the Atomic Weapons Establishment and its predecessor body for his Department in the last 30 years.

Philip Dunne (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence; Ludlow, Conservative)
The information is not held centrally and could be provided only at disproportionate cost.

Written Answers – Nuclear Weapons, Defence, 25 June 2014

Paul Flynn (Newport West, Labour)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what reports covering the factors surrounding the use of nuclear weapons have been (a) prepared and (b) commissioned by his Department.

Philip Dunne (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence; Ludlow, Conservative)
The UK has made it clear that the circumstances in which any employment of nuclear weapons might be contemplated are very remote. We would employ nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances of self-defence and in accordance with our obligations under international law. The UK uses nuclear weapons as a deterrent every single day as demonstrated by the Continuous At Sea Deterrence. The most recent major Government reports that explore these issues are the 2006 White Paper “The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent”; the 2010 SDSR and the 2013 Trident Alternatives Review, all of which are in the public domain.

Written Answers – Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation, Defence, 23 June 2014

Angus Robertson (SNP Westminster Leader; Moray, Scottish National Party)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what assessment his Department has made of whether arrangements for defence nuclear co-operations which were agreed at the UK-France summit in January 2014 summit comply with the (a) Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban treaty, (b) treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and (c) other aspects of international law; and if he will place in the Library a copy of any such assessments.

Philip Dunne (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence; Ludlow, Conservative)
Arrangements agreed at the UK-France summit in January 2014 are entirely consistent with all of our obligations under international law including the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban treaty and the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. I am withholding release of any assessments under the principle of legal professional privilege.

Written Answers – France, Defence, 23 June 2014

Angus Robertson (SNP Westminster Leader; Moray, Scottish National Party)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will place in the Library copies of agreements with the French Government to (a) undertake joint research at the Atomic Weapons Establishment Orion and Commissariat à l’Énergie Atomique Laser Megajoule, (b) allow use of hydrodynamics research facility at the Atomic Weapons Establishment and (c) peer review technical and scientific data underpinning nuclear warhead certification.

Philip Dunne (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence; Ludlow, Conservative)
The agreements with the French Government to undertake joint research described are detailed in article 1 of the TEUTATES treaty 2010, available at:

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228571/7975.pdf

Written Answers – Awe, Defence, 23 June 2014

Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North, Labour)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what facility rekit projects have taken place at the Atomic Weapons Establishment under the scope of the Nuclear Weapons Capability Sustainment Project; and what the cost of each such project was.

Philip Dunne (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence; Ludlow, Conservative)
The term rekit is used by the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) to mean the replacement or modernisation of process plant and/or equipment within an existing facility, including upgrading of building services. The following is a list of major facility rekits that have or are taking place at AWE. There are also a number of more minor rekits underway which are not listed.

Depleted Uranium Upgrade

Beryllium Facility

Plutonium Capability Programme (A90)

Enriched Uranium Facility (A45)

Explosive storage and processing Facility

Salts Sustainment

Facility for assembly/disassembly of Warhead

The information relating to individual rekit costs for each facility for the years 2003 to date is not centrally held and could be provided only at disproportionate cost.

Written Answers – Nuclear Weapons, Defence, 18 June 2014

Caroline Lucas (Brighton, Pavilion, Green)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what plans he has for reviewing the conduct of and representation on local liaison committees for defence nuclear sites.

Philip Dunne (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence; Ludlow, Conservative)
There are no plans for the Ministry of Defence to review the conduct of, nor representation at, local liaison committees relating to defence nuclear sites. The operation of such committees is a matter for agreement between the individual site operator (the licensee and/or authorisee) and the appropriate local authorities.

Written Answers – Nuclear Weapons, Defence, 10 June 2014

Paul Flynn (Newport West, Labour)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what analysis has been carried out by the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston into the effects on (a) human beings, (b) other animals and (c) the wider environment of the use of a nuclear warhead in the UK nuclear arsenal.

Philip Dunne (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence; Ludlow, Conservative)
The effects of the use of a UK nuclear warhead are underpinned by modelling and analysis. The effects are dependent on a wide range of variable factors including:

the yield and design of the weapon;

the accuracy of the delivery system;

the nature and construction of the target;

the geographical characteristics of the surrounding terrain;

geological conditions in the target area;

the height of weapon burst; and

the weather conditions at the target.

Written Answers – Public Expenditure, Defence, 13 May 2014

Nicholas Soames (Mid Sussex, Conservative)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will place in the Library a copy of his Department’s cost of defence output categories taxonomy.

Philip Hammond (The Secretary of State for Defence; Runnymede and Weybridge, Conservative)
The Ministry of Defence’s cost of defence taxonomy is as follows:

Frigates

Aircraft Carriers

Destroyers

Lynx Mk 3/8

Minehunters

Patrol vessels

Survey vessels and Ice Patrol

RW (SAR)

Test, Simulation

Landing Platform Dock

Landing Platform Helicopter

Landing Ship Dock

Sea King Mk 7 ASaC, Mk 5 SAR

Army Manning/Training Margin

Army phase 1 training

Army phase 2 training

Army phase 3 training

Defence CBRN Wing

Civilian Training

Light Brigades

Air Assault Brigade

Armoured Brigades

Attack Helicopters

Support Helicopters

Mech Brigades

RAF Force Protection

RAF Reserves

Royal Marines

RNR and RMR

Logistic Brigades

2 MED Brigade

Defence Medical Services

Artillery Regts

Engr Regts

Signals Regts

HQ Theatre Troops

Commitments staff

PJHQ, JFHQ, Theatre HQs

Battle-Space Command and Control Communications and Information Systems

IS and Communications Capability Projects

Deployed Ops supporting units

Deployable HQ

Maritime Warfare Centre

Joint Combat Aircraft

Tornado

Nuclear Deterrent

Nuclear Estate

Merlin

Ship Submarine Ballistic Nuclear

Ship Submarine Nuclear

Estate Disposals

MOD Estate

Regional Prime Contracts

Service Families Accommodation

Single Living Accommodation

Supporting infrastructure (utilities)

Sustainability (DE&S War Reserves/Op Stocks)

IS for Logistics

Permanent Joint Operating Bses

A400M

BAe125

BAe146

C17

Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft

Hercules

Tristar

VC10

Auxiliary Oiler

Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment

Royal Fleet Auxiliary

Forward Repair Ship

Joint Casualty Treatment Ship

Defence Intelligence Staff

ASTOR

E3-D

Rivet Joint

Ballistic Missile Early Warning System

Electronic Warfare

UK Air Surveillance and Control

Army Joint and Collective Training

Specialist Training

Defence Academy

RAF Joint and Collective Training

RN Joint and Collective Training

RAF Manning/Training Margin

RAF phase 1 training

RAF phase 2 training

RAF phase 3 training

Army Cadets

Army Recruiting

RAF Cadets

RAF Recruiting

RAF Aerobatic Team

RN Cadets

RN Recruiting

Regional Forces—Northern Ireland

Regional Forces—Germany

Regional Forces—GB

SIT Outputs

Army Reserves

RN Manning/Training Margin

RN phase 1 training

RN phase 2 training

RN phase 3 training

MOD Police and Guarding

Special Forces

Typhoon

Fleet Air Arm Fixed Wing.

Oral Answers to Questions -Scotland, Defence, 12 May 2014

Angus Robertson (SNP Westminster Leader; Moray, Scottish National Party)
The Ministry of Defence is responsible for ensuring that Scotland is a maritime nation with no maritime patrol aircraft and no ocean-going vessels. The MOD is also responsible for the closure of two out of three air bases in Scotland and the disproportionate cut to personnel and spending, while at the same time committing to Trident, which the majority of people in Scotland oppose. May I appeal to the Minister and the Secretary of State to come for more day trips to Scotland so that people can contrast the appalling reality of MOD decisions in Scotland with the ludicrous scaremongering of the UK Government?

Andrew Murrison (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence; South West Wiltshire, Conservative)
The hon. Gentleman says that there are no ocean-going vessels, but he has forgotten the submarine service, which, for a Scottish MP, is a huge omission. He talks about maritime patrol aircraft, but he says nothing about how he would analyse the data that maritime patrol aircraft are designed to collect. He talks about two warships, yet he tells us in his White Paper that the only way he can refuel them, and thus extend their scope, is by relying on the Royal Navy.

Oral Answers to Questions – Ukraine (UK Defence Policy), Defence, 12 May 2014

Rory Stewart (Penrith and The Border, Conservative)
Will the Secretary of State clarify what steps he is taking to develop non-nuclear options for deterrence to prevent a repeat of what Russia has done in Ukraine? Economic sanctions are clearly insufficient. Will he and our international partners investigate, for example, the use of cyber-attacks as a potential deterrent?

Philip Hammond (The Secretary of State for Defence; Runnymede and Weybridge, Conservative)
As I have previously announced, we are developing our cyber capabilities, and they form a part of our overall armoury. The trick here is to provide clear reassurance and to deter any moves by anybody against NATO states in any mistaken belief that our resolve is in any way lacking, while not provoking in a way that would be unhelpful. I hope that we are getting that balance right at the moment, and we shall endeavour to continue to do so.

Written Answers – USA, Defence, 28 April 2014

Paul Flynn (Newport West, Labour)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many staff from (a) his Department and (b) the Atomic Weapons Establishment are on secondment to an institution in the United States involved in nuclear weapons development or nuclear warhead stockpile, stewardship, stability and safety research.

Philip Dunne (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence; Ludlow, Conservative)
There are no Ministry of Defence staff and 15 Atomic Weapons Establishment staff employed by AWE plc on secondment to these institutions in the United States.

Written Answers – Trident, Defence, 28 April 2014

Bob Ainsworth (Coventry North East, Labour)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what recent assessment he has made of the (a) associated costs and (b) utility of the Trident Alternatives Review.

Philip Hammond (The Secretary of State for Defence; Runnymede and Weybridge, Conservative)
I have made no such assessment.

Written Answers – Nuclear Non-proliferation Treat, Defence,  28 April 2014

Simon Kirby (Brighton, Kemptown, Conservative)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence when he last discussed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty with his counterparts from the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council; and if he will make a statement.

Andrew Murrison (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence; South West Wiltshire, Conservative)
The Secretary of State for Defence, my right hon. Friend Mr Hammond, discusses a range of topics with his counterparts from the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, including subjects related to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. However, engagement with our international partners on this Treaty is led by the Foreign Secretary.

Written Answers to Questions – Defence, 25 Mar 2014

Andrew Murrison (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence; South West Wiltshire, Conservative)
The cost associated with the decommissioning, care and maintenance of current facilities at the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston and Burghfield was estimated to be in the order of £1.1 billion as at 31 March 2013, at 2012-13 prices. This figure includes the conditioning, retrieval and storage of contaminated materials.

The MOD has no responsibility for decommissioning the Sellafield site, facilities or equipment. This falls to the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA). The nuclear provision for NDA sites, including Sellafield, is set out in the NDA annual report and accounts, the latest version of which was published in June 2013.

Oral Answers to Questions – Defence, 17 Mar 2014

Julian Lewis (New Forest East, Conservative)
Much as no one wishes to see the cold war return, do not recent events between Russia and Ukraine indicate that this is not some flight of fancy, but that it really could happen, and does that not mean that we must be extremely careful never to let down our nuclear or conventional defence guard?

What those events do show is that we have been right throughout in maintaining the need to continue with a strategic nuclear deterrent as the ultimate guarantor of Britain’s sovereignty and freedom of action. The world is a very uncertain place, while the time horizons for the provision of military equipment are very long, and we are looking forward 40 or 50 years in the planning. The events of the past months and years show that it would be a very brave man indeed who said that there would be no threat to our sovereignty and independence over that time horizon.

Written Answer, Nuclear Installations – Defence, 25 Mar 2014

Paul Flynn (Newport West, Labour)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what assessment he has made of the future cost of the decommissioning of facilities at (a) AWE Aldermaston, (b) AWE Burghfield and (c) Sellafield once the operating life of those facilities has come to an end.

Andrew Murrison (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence; South West Wiltshire, Conservative)
The cost associated with the decommissioning, care and maintenance of current facilities at the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston and Burghfield was estimated to be in the order of £1.1 billion as at 31 March 2013, at 2012-13 prices. This figure includes the conditioning, retrieval and storage of contaminated materials.

The MOD has no responsibility for decommissioning the Sellafield site, facilities or equipment. This falls to the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA). The nuclear provision for NDA sites, including Sellafield, is set out in the NDA annual report and accounts, the latest version of which was published in June 2013.

Written Answer, Trident – Defence, 18 Mar 2014

Jonathan Edwards (Shadow PC Spokesperson (Treasury); Carmarthen East and Dinefwr, Plaid Cymru)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence

(1) what financial contribution would be requested from the Welsh Government in relocation costs if Trident were moved to the Cleddau in the event of Scottish independence;

(2) what estimate he has made of the (a) cost and (b) timescale on relocating Trident to the Cleddau in the event of Scottish independence;

(3) what representations he has received from the Welsh Government on the protocols required between the UK and Welsh Governments pertaining to environmental protection in the Cleddau estuary should Trident be moved from its current base in Scotland;

(4) what recent discussions he has had with the Welsh Government on relocating Trident to the Cleddau in the event of Scottish independence.

Andrew Murrison (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence; South West Wiltshire, Conservative)
The UK Government’s position is clear: Scotland benefits from being part of the UK and the UK benefits from having Scotland within it. The UK is not making plans for Scottish independence and is not making plans to move the nuclear deterrent or other submarines from Her Majesty’s Naval Base Clyde. HM Naval Base Clyde is the largest employment site in Scotland, with around 6,700 military and civilian jobs now, increasing to around 8,200 by 2022 when it becomes home to all of the Royal Navy’s submarines. We have not received any official representations from the Welsh Government nor had discussions with them regarding the basing in Wales of the nuclear deterrent.

Written Ministerial Statement, Submarine Dismantling Project – Defence, 13 Feb 2014

Philip Dunne (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence; Ludlow, Conservative)
I am announcing today that the Ministry of Defence’s submarine dismantling project (SDP) has published the provisional shortlist of candidate sites for the storage of intermediate level radioactive waste removed from nuclear-powered submarines after they have left naval service and been defuelled. The storage will be for an interim period until the UK’s geological deposit facility is available some time after 2040.

I previously announced on 22 March 2013, Hansard, column 61WS that all nuclear licensed and authorised sites in the UK, including those owned by the MOD, the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) and industry, would be considered on an equal basis. This approach was based on the findings from an initial public consultation, which ran from October 2011 to February 2012, and was announced by the then Minister for Defence Equipment, Support and Technology my hon. Friend Sir Peter Luff on 27 October 2011, Hansard, column 16WS.

All such sites have now been considered and the five that have been provisionally shortlisted for the interim store are as follows:

the atomic weapons establishment sites at Aldermaston and Burghfield in Berkshire, which are owned by the MOD and run by AWE plc;

Sellafield in Cumbria and Chapelcross in Dumfriesshire, which are owned by the NDA; and

Capenhurst in Cheshire, which is run by Capenhurst Nuclear Services.

In line with good practice on public consultation, we will now enter a period of pre-engagement with local authorities, elected representatives and established site stakeholder groups at each of the candidate sites. This will provide these groups with an early opportunity to understand and comment on the criteria that should be considered during the main assessment of shortlisted sites. It will also help us to shape the formal public consultation that we will carry out before any decisions are made.

Following this period of pre-engagement, our aim is to publish the final shortlist of sites in summer 2014. These will then be taken forward as the basis for public consultation, which will be carried out locally, around each candidate site, and nationally. Our plan is for the public consultation to begin towards the end of this year and end early next year.

Further information on the SDP and a copy of the proposed criteria and screening report, which contains more detail about why individual sites were chosen for the provisional shortlist, can be found at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/submarine-dismantling-project-interim-storage-of-intermediate-level-radioactive-waste.

Copies of these reports will also be placed in the Library of the House.

Written Answer, Trident – Defence, 13 Feb 2014

Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North, Labour)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence

(1) what recent estimate he has made of the cost at outturn prices of the Trident replacement programme;

(2) what estimate he has made of the (a) expenditure and percentage share of his Department’s procurement budget that the design and construction of the Trident replacement submarines will represent and (b) what the running costs and percentage share of his Department’s overall spending of the existing Trident nuclear weapons system will be in each of the next 10 years;

(3) what the estimated annual expenditure and percentage share of his Department’s procurement budget the design and construction of the Astute-class submarines will represent in each of the next 10 years.

Andrew Murrison (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence; South West Wiltshire, Conservative)
Current forecast costs, including planned Submarine Enterprise Performance Programme efficiency measures, indicate that we remain within the 2006 White Paper estimates of £11 billion-£14 billion (at 2006-07 prices) for the Successor platform costs (assuming a four boat fleet). This equates to some £25 billion at out-turn prices.

I refer the hon. Member to the Ministry of Defence Major Projects Report for 2013, published today by the National Audit Office, which includes the latest estimate of costs for the Astute programme.

The in-service costs of the UK’s nuclear deterrent, which include the Atomic Weapons Establishment’s costs, are around 5-6% of the defence budget.

The Department’s budget beyond 2015-16 has not been agreed and will be subject to consultation in the next spending review. Additionally, estimates on individual projects are subject to ongoing negotiations with industry. Therefore, I am withholding details of the proposed spending and annualised percentages at project level, as to release this information would be likely to impact upon the formulation of Government policy and future negotiations with industry. The Department annually publishes detail on equipment expenditure for the next 10 years in the Defence Equipment Plan. The latest version was published in 2012 (DMC00575 01-13) and I expect to publish the 2013 version in the near future.

Written Answer, Nuclear Submarines – Defence, 13 Feb 2014

Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North, Labour)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what estimate he has made of the cost of nuclear liabilities associated with berthing and decommissioning submarines, decontamination of associated sites and storage of related nuclear materials, including disaggregation by (a) out-of service submarines, (b) in-service submarines and (c) Trident replacement submarines.

Andrew Murrison (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence; South West Wiltshire, Conservative)
The nuclear liabilities provision contained within the Ministry of Defence Annual Report and Accounts for 2012-13 was £3.7 billion.

Within this total, the nuclear liabilities associated with berthing and decommissioning submarines, decontamination of associated sites and the storage of related nuclear materials are as follows:

Liability Description Liability (£ million)
Afloat Storage 356
Submarine Dismantling 718
Decommissioning of Astute Boats 1 and 2 (reactor and hull) 50
Long term storage and processing of spent fuel 537

Other than the afloat storage liability relating to out-of-service submarines and the Astute boat decommissioning liability relating to in-service submarines, the provisions cannot be disaggregated.

It is too early in the life of the Trident replacement programme for liabilities to be accounted for.


Written Answer, Libya – Defence, 13 Feb 2014

Andrew Rosindell (Romford, Conservative)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what involvement UK armed forces currently have in Libya.

Mark Francois (The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence; Rayleigh and Wickford, Conservative)
The UK has a Defence Advisory Team in Tripoli of 24 personnel, commanded by a Brigadier, which works to support the UK/Libya relationship and provides advice through advisors embedded in the Libyan MOD, navy, air force, land forces and border security force. There is also a senior disarmament advisor working with the Government of Libya, the UN and international partners on disarmament issues.

The team also provides the platform for short term training teams to support a variety of programmes, including strategic communication, developing explosive ordnance disposal schools, supporting the creation of a joint operational planning staff and naval training.

In November 2013, the UK also established a Defence Section within the British embassy, Tripoli with a Defence Attaché.


Nuclear Weapons Tests (Veterans), Oral Answers to Questions — Defence, 3 Feb 2014

Emma Lewell-Buck (South Shields, Labour)
What steps his Department is taking to support veterans of nuclear weapons tests.

Anna Soubry (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of Stte for Defence; Broxtowe, Conservative)
It is important for me to make clear that the Government continue to recognise, and be grateful to, all the servicemen who participated in the British nuclear testing programme. Like all veterans, they are entitled to a comprehensive range of support from the veterans welfare service at the Service Personnel and Veterans Agency, which can also put them in contact with other organisations that can help with specific issues.

Emma Lewell-Buck (South Shields, Labour)
I am sure the Minister is aware that, according to the British Nuclear Test Veterans Association, nearly half the descendants of those veterans have experienced some kind of congenital problem such as illness or disability, while the veterans themselves are particularly susceptible to cancer and other diseases. Will she consider establishing a benevolent fund to support those who are still suffering the after-effects of nuclear tests?

Anna Soubry (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of Stte for Defence; Broxtowe, Conservative)
We had a lengthy debate in, I think, Westminster Hall on this very issue. I am aware of the argument that is being advanced by the survivors, but there is no evidence to support their claims, and I do not think that it would be right to set up a £25 million benevolent fund when no proper basis for it has been provided. I am always available to listen to arguments, but so far I have heard no good argument to support that case.

Oliver Colvile (Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport, Conservative)
Will my hon. Friend ensure that the nuclear veterans data are shared with other parts of the national health service, so that it can deal with some of the issues that may arise?

Anna Soubry (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of Stte for Defence; Broxtowe, Conservative)
I cannot see any difficulty with that. As long as people have given permission for their data to be shared, it seems to me to be eminently sensible.

Russian Naval Ships, Oral Answers to Questions — Defence, 3 Feb 2014

[…]

John Woodcock (Barrow and Furness, Labour)
Does not the debate on this issue underline the importance of our combined—UK—Royal Navy, and also the potential in the strategic NATO alliance? Does the Secretary of State not agree that, in the words of another political figure, it would be “unpardonable folly” to put at risk that NATO alliance by disavowing the very strategic nuclear concept on which it is based?

Philip Hammond (The Secretary of State for Defence; Runnymede and Weybridge, Conservative)
The hon. Gentleman is right on all counts. NATO’s strategic nuclear concept of course provides protection for the whole of the United Kingdom. Our very close relationship with our NATO allies—in this case, specifically with Norway—ensures that we have good visibility and good intelligence about Russian vessels and, indeed, Russian aircraft approaching the UK’s area of interest.

[…]

Topical Questions, Oral Answers to Questions – Defence, 3 Feb 2014

[…]

Vernon Coaker (Shadow Secretary of State for Defence; Gedling, Labour)
Having been to Barrow after a few days in post to see the successor programme and having met Keep our Future Afloat and the trade unions regularly since then, my and our position is clear. Perhaps the Secretary of State is a little confused. Are these whispers he says he has heard about the Opposition in fact about those he serves alongside in government, namely the Liberal Democrats? Is it not his coalition partners, not Labour, where the opposition comes from when it comes to retaining a nuclear deterrent?

Philip Hammond (The Secretary of State for Defence; Runnymede and Weybridge, Conservative)
In terms of official party policy the hon. Gentleman is of course right and I do not know why he is trying to make a spat out of this: we agree on this issue. He knows very well, however, who within his party is seeking to reopen this issue. He knows what is going on behind the scenes and I absolutely support his determination to hold the line in the Labour party. I wish him every success in doing so.

[…]

Julian Lewis (New Forest East, Conservative)
May we acclaim the fact that Members of both the Conservative
and Labour Front Benches are vying to show which party is the more committed to the successor Trident nuclear system? Is the Secretary of State aware that an analyst at the normally sensible Royal United Services Institute defence think-tank has suggested that even an inactive fleet of submarines can help deter actors from seriously threatening the UK? Does he agree that to adopt such a dangerously destabilising posture would not even save any significant money at all?

Philip Hammond (The Secretary of State for Defence; Runnymede and Weybridge, Conservative)
First, I agree with my hon. Friend. The outcome of the Trident review precisely showed that the negative impact on our strategic defence would not be justified by the small amounts of money that would be saved by changing the posture. May I also say to him that in respect of the specific article to which he refers, the content was much more measured than the headline suggested and in fact made it clear that there would be very significant additional risks in adopting a different nuclear posture?

[…]

Written Answer, Trident Submarines – Defence, 29 Jan 2014

Paul Flynn (Newport West, Labour)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the answer of 3 December 2013, Official Report, columns 639-40W, on Trident submarines, what the value of each contract was.

Philip Dunne (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence; Ludlow, Conservative)
The value of each contract provided in my answer of 3 December 2013, Hansard, columns 639-40W:

Contract Description Value (£)
1 Design Phase-BAES 671,986,515
2 Design Phase-Babcock 51,032,000
3 Design Phase-Rolls Royce 1
4 Design Phase-Collaboration 2
5 Mast Raising 434,833
6 Submarine Communications Technology Demonstration Programme 4,962,000
7. Retention of Astute Test Rig 334,505
8 Submarine Communications 2,559,259
9 Safety and Environment 1,151,625
10 Strategic Weapon System Safety 206,025
11 Strategic Weapon System Requirements 171,323
12 Pressure Hull Materials 3
13 Pressure Hull Glands 3
14 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Services 3
15 Composites Programme Technology Demonstrator Programme 509,173
16 Successor Facilities-Barrow 3
17 Extension Engineering Assurance 1,429,335
18 Costs and Tools 1,724,646
19 Signatures 1,149,854
20 Requirements and Standards 792,800
21 Technical Assurance and Non Acoustic Signature 3
22 Electrical Actuator Future Work (Phase 2) 427,509
23 Equipment Security Grading 44,373
24 Electro Magnetic Silencing 124,642
25 Electro Magnetic Silencing 69,763
26 Successor Stage 3 Environmental Shock Grade Curve Activities 449,323
27 Spatial Governance Technical Support 115,606
28 Variable Pressure Hydraulics Decision Support 24,917
29 Electromagnetic Silencing 280,000
30 Countermeasures Deployment Studies 12,000
31 Support to Signature Management 150,000
32 Core Task 180,000
33 Composite Task 110,000
34 Adviser Team to Future Submarine 155,000
35 Signature support to Future Submarine Project Team 105,000
36 Future Capability Support 87,500
37 Infrastructure Assessment Study 139,900
38 Capability System Requirement Document 71,600
39 Technology Assessment of Countermeasure Launcher capability 3
40 Provision of Signature Support 100,000
41 Provision of Subject Matter Expert Support 72,000
42 Submarine Communications Subject Matter Expert Technical Support 260,000
43 Successor Propulsor and Hydrodynamics 45,000
44 Independent Technical and Programme Support 222,400
45 Electrical and Whole Boat 285,000
46 Multi Function Broad Spectrum Array and Future Telemetry System trials 30,920
47 Next Generation Nuclear Propulsion Plant Phase 9 4375,620,039
48 Next Generation Nuclear Propulsion Plant Phase 10 onwards 132,427,662
49 Independent Nuclear Propulsion Advice and Assessment 5141,079,000
50 Submarines Support Partner Task 99,980
1 Not Let-This contract was not let because the activity has been incorporated into the Next Generation Nuclear Propulsion contracts, 47 and 48. Zero Value-This contract has been placed, but any value will depend on what activity is carried out under it. 3 Not Let-These are currently at the tender/negotiation stage and the contracts have not yet been awarded. 4 This contract value covers Phases 1-9. This contract covers technical and safety advice on all nuclear plant in the current fleet. Only a proportion, approximately £12 million, relates to the replacement Trident submarines.


Written Answer, Trident – Defence, 28 Jan 2014

Angus Robertson (SNP Westminster Leader; Moray, Scottish National Party)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the replacement value is of a single UK Trident warhead.

Philip Dunne (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence; Ludlow, Conservative)
The UK is not producing replacement Trident warheads and costing for a future warhead is subject to consideration in the next Parliament.

Written Answer, Navy – Defence, 27 Jan 2014

Angus Robertson (SNP Westminster Leader; Moray, Scottish National Party)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the Order of Battle is of the Fleet.

Mark Francois (The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence; Rayleigh and Wickford, Conservative)
As at 22 January 2014, the Order of Battle for the Fleet is shown in the following table.

Order of Battle
Landing Platform Helicopter 2
Landing Platform Dock 2
T45 6
T23 13
Hunt Class MCV 8
Sandown Class MCV 7
River Class Offshore Patrol Vessels 3
Helicopter Offshore Patrol Vessels 1
P2000 Patrol Boats 18
Ocean Survey Vessels 1
Coastal Survey Vessels 3
Ice Patrol Ship 1
Ships Submersible Ballistic Nuclear 4
Ship Submersible Nuclear 7
Assault Helicopters—Sea King Mk4 1 Sqn
Search and Rescue—Sea King Mk5 1 Sqn
Airbourne Surveillance and Control—Sea King Mk7 3 Sqns
Anti Submarine and Anti Surface:
Merlin Mk1 and Mk2 4 Sqns
Lynx Mk8 and Wildcat 3 Sqns
Battlefield Helicopters—Wildcat 1 Sqn
Elementary Flying 3 Sqns
Beechcraft King Air 350ER Avenger 1 Sqn

For the Royal Fleet Auxiliary:

Order of Battle
Fleet Tankers 2
Support Tankers 1
Small Fleet Tankers 2
Fleet Replenishment Ships 3
Landing Ship Dock 3
Aviation Training Ship 1
Forward Repair Ship 1


Written Answer, AWE Aldermaston – Defence, 22 Jan 2014

Nick Harvey (North Devon, Liberal Democrat)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence when nuclear processing operations recommenced in the main processing building at the Atomic Weapons Establishment, Aldermaston, following the Improvement Notice from the Office for Nuclear Regulation.

Philip Dunne (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence; Ludlow, Conservative)
The Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) Improvement Notice issued on 9 November 2012 to AWE plc prohibits nuclear processing operations in the uranium component manufacturing facility until completion of the repairs to structural steel work. The original deadline given by the ONR for completion of the works was 31 December 2013; but the ONR has agreed to extend the deadline to 31 May 2015. Plans for the subsequent re-commencement of processing operations are still being considered.

Written Answers, Nuclear Weapons: Safety – Defence, 22 Jan 2014

Nick Harvey (North Devon, Liberal Democrat)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the name, date and location is of each nuclear weapons accident response exercise which (a) took place in 2013 and (b) is scheduled for 2014.

Andrew Murrison (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence; South West Wiltshire, Conservative)
Information on the names, dates and locations of nuclear weapons accident response exercises which took place in 2013 and provisional dates for exercises scheduled for 2014 is provided in the following tables:

Exercises conducted in 2013
Date Location
Orange Eagle 15 to 19 April 2013 Bramley Military Training Area
Sitex (A) 8 June 2013 AWE Aldermaston
Orange Eagle 5 to 9 August 2013 AWE Aldermaston
Osmosis 13 23 to 26 September 2013 RAF Honington
Open Isotope 27 to 29 September 2013 RAF Honington
Astral Climb 13 24 October 2013 RAF Dishforth
Astral Bend 13 5 to 6 November 2013 RNAS Merryfield
Aldex 7 November 2013 AWE Aldermaston
Exercises scheduled for 2014
Date Location
Orange Eagle March 2014 Berkshire
Bowline 14 May 2014 Scotland
Astral Bend 14 June 2014 Pembrokeshire
Astral Climb 14 September 2014 Gloucester
Osmosis 14 September 2014 Gloucester
Open Isotope September 2014 Gloucester
Orange Eagle November 2014 Hampshire

Written Answers , Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator – Defence, 20 Jan 2014

Angus Robertson (SNP Westminster Leader; Moray, Scottish National Party)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence when work on (a) the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator’s review of the Ministry of Defence nuclear regulatory framework and (b) the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator’s regulatory strategy will be complete; and whether his Department will publish those documents.

Philip Dunne (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence; Ludlow, Conservative)
The Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator (DNSR) initiated a Review in March 2013 of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) nuclear regulatory framework, broadly based on the established good practice set down by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Integrated Regulatory Review Service. The Review team was subject to independent oversight and reported in July 2013. It concluded that the DNSR currently has the resources, both internally and by contract, to undertake the full range of its responsibilities and that the MOD has an appropriate nuclear regulatory framework. There are a number of recommendations and suggestions that are being addressed by the DNSR.
The DNSR Strategy 2013 to 2023, setting out the broad medium and long-term direction and focus for the DNSR, was produced in October 2013.
The review and strategy documents will be considered for publication in due course.