Ministry of Defence

Written Ministerial Statement – Future Nuclear Deterrent – 2016 Update to Parliament, Ministry of Defence, 20 December 2016

Michael Fallon The Secretary of State for Defence
On 18 May 2011 the then Defence Secretary, the Right Hon. Member for North Somerset (Dr Liam Fox), made an oral statement to the House (Official Report, column 351) announcing the approval of the Initial Gate investment stage for the procurement of the successor submarines to the Vanguard Class ballistic missile submarines. He also placed in the Library of the House a report “The United Kingdom’s Future Nuclear Deterrent: The Submarine Initial Gate Parliamentary Report”.

As confirmed in the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review, and in accordance with the motion approved by this House on 18 July 2016, this Government is committed to publishing an annual report on the programme. I am today publishing the fifth report, “The United Kingdom’s Future Nuclear Deterrent: 2016 Update to Parliament“. A copy has been placed in the Library of the House.

Written Answer to Questions – Ballistic Missile Defence: Warships, Ministry of Defence, 15 December 2016

Douglas Chapman Scottish National Party, Dunfermline and West Fife
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, which ballistic missile defence systems protect the UK; and whether the Government has considered the potential merits of the use of ship-based ballistic missile defence systems.

Harriett Baldwin The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence
The ultimate guarantee of our security is provided by our independent nuclear deterrent. In addition, the NATO Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) network protects the UK and, as set out in the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), we will invest in a ground-based BMD radar which will enhance this system. We are investigating the potential of the Royal Navy’s Type 45 Destroyer to operate in a BMD role, as also set out in the SDSR.

Written Answer to Questions – Veterans: Radiation Exposure, Ministry of Defence, 9 December 2016

Hywel Williams Shadow PC Spokesperson (International Development), Shadow PC Spokesperson (Work and Pensions), Shadow PC Spokesperson (Culture, Media and Sport), Shadow PC Spokesperson (Defence), Shadow PC Spokesperson (Foreign and Commonwealth Office/Europe), PC Westminster Leader
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what support his Department has given to the children of nuclear test veterans who have suffered congenital deformities and unidentified illnesses as a result of their fathers being stationed on Christmas Island during nuclear tests in the 1950s.

Mark Lancaster The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence
The Ministry of Defence (MOD) has seen no published peer-reviewed evidence of excess illness or mortality among nuclear test veterans or their offspring as a group that could be linked to their participation in the UK’s atmospheric nuclear tests or to exposure to radiation as a result of that participation. Formal and well-documented procedures were in place to ensure the health and safety of those participating in the tests.

Any veteran who believes they have suffered ill health due to service has the right to apply for no-fault compensation under the War Pensions Scheme. War Pensions are payable in respect of illness or injury as a result of service in the Armed Forces before 6 April 2005, with the benefit of reasonable doubt always given to the claimant. Decisions are medically certified and follow consideration of available service and medical evidence and carry full rights of appeal to an independent Tribunal.

The provision of healthcare to nuclear test veterans and their children is primarily the responsibility of the National Health Service, who work in close partnership with the MOD and Service charities to ensure that veterans get the best possible care. The MOD is determined to ensure that veterans who require help are provided with appropriate support including through the Veterans UK helpline and the Veterans Welfare Service which can be contacted on Freephone: 0808 1914 2 18

On 11 November 2016 the MOD announced a consortium of charities led by The Royal British Legion had been selected to provide the Veteran’s Gateway. The Veterans Gateway programme, funded by a £2 million Covenant Fund grant, will provide a one-stop service to better support the veterans’ community and help in accessing public, private and charitable services in the UK. It will provide a 24/7 telephone number, dedicated website and mobile app to make it easier for veterans to access support on issues including housing, employability and health. It will be formally launched in the first half of 2017.

Written Answer to Questions – Radioactive Materials: Transport, Ministry of Defence, 5 December 2016

Jim Cunningham Labour, Coventry South
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what recent assessment he has made of the adequacy of the level of safety provision afforded to convoys of defence nuclear material across UK road and rail; and if he will make a statement.

Harriett Baldwin The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence
Safety provisions for the movement of Defence Nuclear Material by road and rail are regulated and assessed by the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator (DNSR). The most recent DNSR assessments, of road in June 2016 and rail in September 2016, found that safety arrangements were adequate, demonstrating that performance meets the required standard.

A wide range of safety and contingency measures are in place to ensure the safe movement of Defence Nuclear Materials. These are summarised in the publicly available Local Authority and Emergency Services Information document.

Written Answer to Questions – Radioactive Materials: Transport, Ministry of Defence, 2 December 2016

Jim Cunningham Labour, Coventry South
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what estimate he has made of the cost to the public purse of the movement of defence nuclear material across UK road and rail; and if he will make a statement.

Harriett Baldwin The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence
The cost of the transportation of defence nuclear material across UK road and rail is not held centrally and could be provided only at disproportionate cost.

Written Answer to Questions – Trident, Ministry of Defence, 28 November 2016

Jim McMahon Shadow Minister (Communities and Local Government) (Devolution)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what steps he is taking to allow and support British companies to bid for contracts in the procurement process for the Trident successor programme.

Harriett Baldwin The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence
The use of competition remains the cornerstone of defence procurement and this approach has been successful in driving efficiency into the UK defence industry.

We are working with our Tier One contractors, who are responsible for procurement, on a range of measures designed to ensure opportunities are better advertised and to encourage British companies to bid for contracts.

The Dreadnought class submarine programme represents billions of pounds of investment in thousands of British jobs, across hundreds of firms, from Scotland to the South of England

85% of BAE Systems supply chain for the new submarines is based in the UK.

Written Answer to Questions – Nuclear Submarines: Decommissioning, Ministry of Defence, 4 November 2016

Steven Paterson Scottish National Party, Stirling
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, which submarine will undergo Initial Dismantling at Rosyth.

Steven Paterson Scottish National Party, Stirling
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, how much his Department has spent on maintenance and checks for the nuclear-powered submarines in laid-up storage at (a) Her Majesty’s Naval Base Devonport and (b) Rosyth Dockyard.

Harriett Baldwin The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence
The Ministry of Defence has spent to date a total of circa. £34.4 million on the maintenance and checks carried out by the Department and regulators on the decommissioned submarines that are awaiting disposal.

The approximate figures for Her Majesty’s Naval Base Devonport and Rosyth Dockyard are circa. £11.9 million and £22.5 million respectively.

The first submarine to undergo initial dismantling under the Submarine Dismantling Programme will be HMS Swiftsure.

Written Answer to Questions – Nuclear Submarines: Decommissioning, Ministry of Defence, 28 October 2016

Steven Paterson Scottish National Party, Stirling
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, how many nuclear-powered submarines are waiting for decommissioning work to be (a) commenced and (b) completed.

Harriett Baldwin The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence
There are 12 submarines in laid-up storage in Her Majesty’s Naval Base Devonport and seven at Rosyth Dockyard. Under the Submarine Dismantling Project (SDP) one submarine will commence ‘Initial Dismantling’ at Rosyth later in 2016, subject to regulatory permissions, to refine the process.

While laid-up, the submarines are subject to regular maintenance and checks by both the Ministry of Defence and regulators, and pose no additional risk to workers or members of the public.

Written Answer to Questions – Nuclear Submarines: Decommissioning, Ministry of Defence, 28 October 2016

Steven Paterson Scottish National Party, Stirling
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what contingency plans his Department has for the decommissioning of nuclear-powered submarines if a suitable geological disposal facility is not identified.

Harriett Baldwin The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence
Intermediate Level Waste (ILW) is the only type of waste from submarines that will require the use of a Geological Disposal Facility (GDF). A facility for the interim storage of ILW has been arranged at Capenhurst in Cheshire until the proposed GDF is available from 2040. In line with Government guidance, the interim ILW store will have a design life of at least 100 years – considerably longer than it is anticipated will be required.

Written Answer to Questions – Nuclear Weapons: Transport, Ministry of Defence, 28 October 2016

Margaret Ferrier Shadow SNP Spokesperson (Scotland Office)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what recent assessment he has made of the reliability of the vehicles involved in the transportation of nuclear warheads; and if he will make a statement.

Margaret Ferrier Shadow SNP Spokesperson (Scotland Office)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, how much his Department has spent on the transportation of nuclear warheads between RNAD Coulport and AWE Burghfield in each of the last three years.

Margaret Ferrier Shadow SNP Spokesperson (Scotland Office)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what recent assessment he has made of the security of convoys transporting nuclear warheads by road.

Harriett Baldwin The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence
All vehicles involved in the transportation of nuclear warheads are subject to a rigorous maintenance and inspection regime, carried out by highly skilled and experienced technicians. Inspections are made prior to each use, as well as six monthly safety and annual mandatory inspections.

The costs of the transportation of nuclear warheads between RNAD Coulport and AWE Burghfield are not held centrally and could be provided only at disproportionate cost.

The security of the nuclear warhead convoy was assessed by Ministry of Defence Security Advisors in September 2016 as overall ‘satisfactory’, demonstrating that ‘performance meets the required policy standard’.

Written Answer to Questions – Trident Submarines: Iron and Steel, Ministry of Defence, 25 October 2016

Alan Brown Scottish National Party, Kilmarnock and Loudoun
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what discussions his Department has had with BAE Systems on its decision to use French steel in the construction of the Successor submarines.

Harriett Baldwin The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence
The Ministry of Defence engaged with BAE Systems throughout the procurement process for the specialised steel, including being notified of their decision to award the contract.

Other stages of construction will include grades of steel manufactured by British suppliers and we encourage them to take the opportunity to bid.

85% of BAE Systems supply chain for the new submarines is based in the UK.

Written Answer to Questions – Trident Submarines, Ministry of Defence, 25 October 2016

Alan Brown Scottish National Party, Kilmarnock and Loudoun
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what recent assessment his Department has made of the number of British jobs involved in the Trident successor programme as a result of the recent decision to use French steel in the Successor submarines.

Harriett Baldwin The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence
The Successor programme represents billions of pounds of investment in thousands of British jobs, across hundreds of firms, from Scotland to the South of England.

Other stages of construction will include grades of steel manufactured by British suppliers and we encourage them to take the opportunity to bid.

85% of BAE Systems supply chain for the new submarines is based in the UK.

Written Answer to Questions – Trident Submarines, Ministry of Defence, 25 October 2016

Alan Brown Scottish National Party, Kilmarnock and Loudoun
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what assessment his Department has made of the effect of the recent fall in the value of sterling on the cost of constructing the Successor submarines.

Harriett Baldwin The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence
I refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave on 17 October 2016 to Question 48369 to the hon. Member for Dunfermline and West Fife (Douglas Chapman).

Ministry of Defence Procurement (Word Document, 15.3 KB)

Written Answer to Questions – Trident Submarines: Iron and Steel, Ministry of Defence, 24 October 2016

Stephen Doughty Labour/Co-operative, Cardiff South and Penarth
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to the Answer of 17 October 2016 to Question 48291, what process his Department followed to determine whether a bid to provide specialist steel for the Successor submarine pressure hulls was viable.

Stephen Doughty Labour/Co-operative, Cardiff South and Penarth
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to the Answer of 17 October 2016 to Question 48291, what bids his Department received for the provision of specialist steel required for the pressure hulls for the Successor submarine programme.

Harriett Baldwin The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence
The management of the steel procurement process for the Successor programme is the responsibility of the Prime Contractor, BAE Systems. The Ministry of Defence conducted a technical assessment during the BAE Systems tendering process to ensure bids met specifications.

There were four bids received in total. I am withholding details of the bidding firms as the disclosure of this information would be prejudicial to commercial interests.

Other stages of construction will include grades of steel manufactured by British suppliers and we encourage them to take the opportunity to bid.

85% of BAE Systems supply chain for the new submarines is based in the UK.

Written Ministerial Statement – Successor Submarines, Ministry of Defence, 21 October 2016

Michael Fallon The Secretary of State for Defence
I am pleased to announce that the next generation of nuclear-armed submarines will be known as the Dreadnought Class, and that the first is to be named HMS DREADNOUGHT. Construction of the first submarine formally began on 5 October 2016.

Dreadnought is a name with an excellent historical pedigree, traditionally used for powerful and innovative ships and submarines at the leading edge of technology and is a fitting name both for the class and the first submarine of that class. There have been nine Royal Navy vessels of the name, the most recent being Britain’s first nuclear-powered submarine, launched on this day, Trafalgar Day, in 1960 following her build at Barrow. The new Dreadnought submarines continue Barrow’s long association with submarine construction.

These submarines, the first of which we expect to enter service in the early 2030s, will replace the current Vanguard Class submarines as the ultimate guarantee of our nation’s safety.

Written Answer to Questions – Trident Submarines: Iron and Steel, Ministry of Defence, 21 October 2016

Nicholas Dakin Labour, Scunthorpe
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to the Answer of 18 October 2016 to Question 48618, how many UK bids were received for the supply of steel for that part of the Successor submarine manufacture.

Harriett Baldwin The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence
The management of the steel procurement process for the Successor programme is the responsibility of the Prime Contractor, BAE Systems. One UK firm participated in the tendering process for the submarine pressure hull steel, but did not make a viable proposal.

Other stages of construction will include grades of steel manufactured by British suppliers and we encourage them to take the opportunity to bid.

85% of BAE System’s supply chain for the new submarines is based in the UK.

Written Answer to Questions – Trident Submarines, Ministry of Defence, 18 October 2016

Nicholas Dakin Labour, Scunthorpe
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what discussions his Department had with UK steelmakers before the decision was made to use French steel in the construction of Trident successor submarines.

Tom Blenkinsop Labour, Middlesbrough South and East Cleveland
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, whether his Department received any bid from steel companies with plants in the UK to supply plate steel for the Successor class of nuclear submarines.

Harriett Baldwin The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence
The management of the steel procurement process for the Successor Programme is the responsibility of the Prime Contractor, BAE Systems. The Ministry of Defence’s involvement with suppliers was limited to conducting a technical assessment during the tendering process to ensure bids met specifications.

The tendering process was progressed and concluded by the Prime Contractor, no viable UK bid was received for this part of the Successor submarine manufacture. Other stages of construction will include grades of steel manufactured by British suppliers and I encourage them to take the opportunity to bid.

Overall, 85% of BAE System’s supply chain for the new submarines is based in the UK.

Written Answer to Questions – Trident Submarines: Iron and Steel, Ministry of Defence, 17 October 2016

Stephen Doughty Labour/Co-operative, Cardiff South and Penarth
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what assessment his Department made of whether British steel could be used in the construction of the pressure hulls for the Trident Successor programme.

Harriett Baldwin The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence
The specialised steel required for the Successor submarine pressure hull is not manufactured in the UK and no viable UK bid was received for this part of the Successor submarine manufacture.

Other stages of construction will include grades of steel manufactured by British suppliers and we expect them to take the opportunity to bid.

85% of BAE System’s supply chain for the new submarines is based in the UK.

Written Answer to Questions – Nuclear Submarines, Ministry of Defence, 17 October 2016

Douglas Chapman Scottish National Party, Dunfermline and West Fife
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, whether his Department is considering (a) radial gap electrical propulsion motors and (b) permanent magnet motors for the propulsion systems for the successor-class SSBNs.

Harriett Baldwin The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence
I am withholding information on the type of motors for the propulsion systems being considered for the Successor submarine programme for the purpose of safeguarding national security.

Written Answer to Questions – Trident Submarines, Ministry of Defence, 8 September 2016

Caroline Lucas Green, Brighton, Pavilion
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, with reference to the Answer of 2 March 2016 to Question 28220, which areas have locally determined arrangements for issuing iodine tablets in the event of a radiation emergency involving an operational nuclear reactor; to which nuclear reactors those arrangements are linked in (a) the UK, (b) other countries and (c) areas that have a pre-disposition to households in the detailed planning area; what other arrangements his Department has in place for issuing iodine tablets in areas that do not have pre-distribution to households; and if he will make a statement.

Mike Penning The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence
Locally determined arrangements for issuing stable iodine tablets in the event of a radiation emergency involving the operating reactor of a nuclear powered warship/submarine are in place at: HMNB Clyde, HMNB Devonport, HMNB Portsmouth, Port of Southampton, BAE Systems at Barrow-in-Furness, Portland Port, Loch Goil and Loch Ewe.

Arrangements for responding to radiation emergencies involving operational nuclear reactors in other countries are a matter for the country concerned.

Some pre-distribution of stable iodine tablets to households in the off-site emergency planning zone takes place at Loch Ewe, Portland Port and BAE Systems Barrow-in-Furness

The arrangements for issuing stable iodine tablets in areas that do not have pre-distribution to households are determined by the relevant Local Authority having responsibility for the off-site plan. At some locations the department supports the arrangements through the provision of local Ministry of Defence personnel to assist in the distribution of stable iodine tablets.

Written Answer to Questions – Trident Submarines, Ministry of Defence, 7 September 2016

Kevan Jones Labour, North Durham
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what proportion of the supply chain for the Vanguard-successor programme will be procured from the UK.

Harriett Baldwin The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence
The Ministry of Defence does not compile this information and to do so would incur disproportionate cost. While the Department encourages it’s key suppliers to sub-contract UK companies in the supply chain, it is their responsibility to select individual sub-contractors.

Written Answer to Questions – Ministry of Defence: Staff, Ministry of Defence, 5 September 2016

Kevan Jones Labour, North Durham
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, with reference to page 36 of the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review, how many members of staff are employed in his Department’s commercial specialist team designed to act as the single sponsor for aspects of the defence nuclear enterprise.

Harriett Baldwin The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence
The Ministry of Defence’s (MOD) new Director General Nuclear organisation was established on 1 April this year. The acting Director General was appointed in May and we expect to make a permanent appointment by the end of the year. The MOD Head Office staff working on different aspects of nuclear-related matters have transferred into the new organisation and additional recruitment to strengthen and deepen the capabilities of the team is also taking place. At present, the new organisation has around 120 staff and it is envisaged that this will rise to about 175 staff over the course of the next year.

Written Answer to Questions – Trident Submarines, Ministry of Defence, 5 September 2016

Kevan Jones Labour, North Durham
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, when the first Vanguard successor submarine will come into service.

Kevan Jones Labour, North Durham
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what estimate his Department has of the out-of-service dates for each of the Vanguard-class submarines.

Harriett Baldwin The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence
The UK’s Vanguard Class submarines will begin to leave service by the early 2030s as the Successor submarines are introduced into service. I am withholding their respective planned out-of-service and in-service dates for the purpose of safeguarding national security.

Written Answer to Questions – Trident Submarines, Ministry of Defence, 5 September 2016

Kevan Jones Labour, North Durham
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what assessment his Department has made of the consequences for the viability of the Successor submarine programme of the conclusions of the Infrastructure and Projects Authority’s assessment of that programme.

Harriett Baldwin The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence
The Infrastructure and Projects Authority’s assessment of the Successor submarine programme accords with our own. That is why we have established a new Director General Nuclear sponsor organisation and will set up a new submarine delivery body, as set out in the Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015. The assessment recognises the complexity and scale of delivering the most advanced submarines ever commissioned by the Royal Navy.

Written Answer to Questions – Nuclear Weapons, Ministry of Defence, 27 July 2016

Baroness Jolly Liberal Democrat Principal Spokesperson for Defence (Lords), Shadow LD Spokesperson (Defence), Liberal Democrat Lords Principal Spokesperson for Defence
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what new arrangements they plan to introduce for the delivery of the Nuclear Warhead Capability Sustainment Programme, and when those arrangements will enter into force.

Earl Howe The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence, Deputy Leader of the House of Lords
I refer the noble Baroness to the Written Ministerial Statement made by the Secretary of State for Defence (Michael Fallon) on 21 April 2016 (HCWS689). The contract between the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the Atomic Weapons Establishment Management Limited (AWEML) has been reviewed. As a result of the review, the MOD has greater control over the programme, while ensuring that AWE continues to deliver value for money for the taxpayer. The contract between the MOD and AWEML also provides the opportunity for higher performance incentives, as well as reductions if targets are not met. These arrangements are now in force.

Atomic Weapons Establishment Contract. (Word Document, 13.26 KB)

Written Answer to Questions – Trident Missiles, Ministry of Defence, 27 July 2016

Baroness Jolly Liberal Democrat Principal Spokesperson for Defence (Lords), Shadow LD Spokesperson (Defence), Liberal Democrat Lords Principal Spokesperson for Defence
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what is the in-service date for the UK Trident Mark 4A nuclear warhead; what are the estimated costs of the Mark 4A programme; and what progress has been made to date in delivering that programme.

Earl Howe The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence, Deputy Leader of the House of Lords
I am withholding details of the date of the Mk 4A’s component’s entry into service, progress to date and the cost of the programme, for the purpose of safeguarding national security.

Written Answer to Questions – Trident, Ministry of Defence, 19 July 2016

Andrew Rosindell Conservative, Romford
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what steps his Department has taken to ensure that the actual cost of replacing Trident does not exceed the current estimated cost.

Andrew Rosindell Conservative, Romford
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what steps his Department is taking to ensure that the rollout of the new submarines for the replacement Trident programme does not disrupt the Government’s commitment to having a constant at-sea deterrent.

Harriett Baldwin The Economic Secretary to the Treasury
As set out in the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review, we are taking steps to manage the defence nuclear enterprise and ensure the Successor submarines are delivered to time and budget. As part of this, we have established a new Director-General Nuclear to act as single and accountable focal point within the Ministry of Defence for all aspects of the defence nuclear enterprise. We are also establishing a new submarine delivery body for the procurement and in-service support of all nuclear submarines, including the Successor submarines. We have deliberately moved away from a traditional single ‘Main Gate’ approach, to a staged investment approach with multiple control points. This will enable us to better regulate and control programme funding and delivery.

The rollout of the Successor submarines supports the programme to maintain a Continuous at Sea Deterrent.

Written Statement – Submarine Dismantling Project, Ministry of Defence, 7 July 2016

Philip Dunne Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Defence Procurement)
Today I am announcing that Capenhurst Nuclear Services (CNS), at Capenhurst, in Cheshire, has been selected as the MOD’s site for interim storage of the Intermediate Level radioactive Waste (ILW) from decommissioned nuclear-powered submarines prior to disposal. AWE Aldermaston in Berkshire has been identified as a contingency site.

CNS, Capenhurst will have the capability to store this ILW until it can be disposed of in a Geological Disposal Facility, some time after 2040.

Like all the sites shortlisted, the operator CNS already manage radioactive materials, and were found to meet the Submarine Dismantling Project’s requirements best, including value for money.

There are two options at CNS, Capenhurst to store ILW. The option that MOD will be taking forward is to use an existing facility, with a second on-site contingency option of constructing a new store.

As put forward during the public consultation, we have also selected a contingency site. Should both Capenhurst options prove unsuitable, AWE Aldermaston will then be taken forward as the MOD’s preferred contingency site.

As a responsible nuclear operator the MOD takes seriously its duty to manage the submarine fleet throughout their operational service and during the disposal process. Today’s announcement reiterates my commitment that this activity will be undertaken in a safe, secure, cost-effective and environmentally sound manner.

Written Answer to Questions – Nuclear Weapons, Ministry of Defence, 7 July 2016

Ronnie Campbell Labour, Blyth Valley
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, how many nuclear warheads the UK currently retains.

Philip Dunne Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Defence Procurement)
I refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave on 8 June 2016 to Question 39116 to the hon. Member for Islington South and Finsbury (Emily Thornberry).

Nuclear Disarmament (Word Document, 15.66 KB)

Written Answer to Questions – Trident Submarines: Barrow in Furness, Ministry of Defence, 27 June 2016

Douglas Chapman Scottish National Party, Dunfermline and West Fife
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, how much has been invested in facilities at Barrow-in-Furness to support the Trident renewal programme in 2015-16.

Douglas Chapman Scottish National Party, Dunfermline and West Fife
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, how much the budgeted expenditure is in (a) 2016-17 and (b) 2017-18 on facility improvements at Faslane to support the Trident renewal programme.

Douglas Chapman Scottish National Party, Dunfermline and West Fife
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what the budgeted expenditure is in (a) 2016-17 and (b) 2017-18 on facility improvements at Barrow-in-Furness to support the Trident renewal programme.

Douglas Chapman Scottish National Party, Dunfermline and West Fife
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, how much has been invested on facilities at Faslane to support the Trident renewal programme in 2015-16.

Philip Dunne Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Defence Procurement)
The infrastructure and facilities investments being made at the Barrow-in-Furness and Faslane sites are for all our submarines not just the Successor programme. I am withholding internal Ministry of Defence forecasts on future programme expenditure as disclosure would or would be likely to prejudice on-going commercial negotiations.

Written Answer to Questions – Trident Submarines, Ministry of Defence, 27 June 2016

Iain Stewart Conservative, Milton Keynes South
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what recent assessment he has made of the security benefits of procuring four Successor submarines.

Michael Fallon The Secretary of State for Defence
The United Kingdom’s continuous at sea nuclear deterrent will remain essential to our security today, and for as long as the global security situation demands.

A four-boat fleet is the minimum needed to provide the assurance that at least one submarine will always be at sea on covert patrol.

Written Answer to Questions – Ministry of Defence Police: Trident, Ministry of Defence, 27 June 2016

Deidre Brock Shadow SNP Westminster Group Leader (Scottish Parliament/Scottish Government Liaison), Shadow SNP Spokesperson (Devolved Government Relations)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, whether his Department plans to review the role of the Ministry of Defence Police in safeguarding the Trident nuclear deterrent.

Mark Lancaster The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence
As part of the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review, we are reviewing a series of options that may change the way we provide our policing and guarding at some sites. Further work is required to assess the feasibility and implementation of these options and, at the appropriate time, we will initiate formal consultation with the Ministry of Defence Police staff associations.

Oral Answer to Questions – At-sea Nuclear Deterrent, Ministry of Defence, 27 June 2016

Caroline Ansell Conservative, Eastbourne 12:00 am, 27th June 2016
What assessment he has made of the viability of alternatives to a continuous at-sea nuclear deterrent for protecting national security.

Michael Fallon The Secretary of State for Defence
The 2013 Trident alternatives review considered alternative systems and postures for the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent and concluded that no alternative is as capable, or offers the same degree of resilience, as continuous at-sea deterrence.

Caroline Ansell Conservative, Eastbourne
Some have expressed concern that with advancing technology, our submarines can now be detected and discovered by underwater drones. Can my right hon. Friend assure me that that is not the case?

Michael Fallon The Secretary of State for Defence
Yes, we are confident that our submarine fleet remains safe and secure. We devote considerable resources to assessing capabilities and new technologies that could threaten the operation of our deterrent, including potential threats from the development of cyber and unmanned underwater vehicles. I am happy to reassure my hon. Friend on precisely that point.

John Woodcock Labour/Co-operative, Barrow and Furness
Whoever stands at the Opposition Dispatch Box or at the Government’s, there is a cast iron majority in the House to do the right thing by Trident’s successor and to reach outwards to defend our nation, rather than to turn inwards. Will the vote still happen before the summer recess?

Michael Fallon The Secretary of State for Defence
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for what he has said. There is clearly a majority—[Interruption.] There are those who are opposed in principle, but there is clearly such a majority in this House. I believe that it is right that this House should vote on the principle of the renewal of the deterrent, and I very much hope that he will not have too much longer to wait.

Douglas Chapman Scottish National Party, Dunfermline and West Fife
With the Type 26 frigates well behind schedule, it has been said that the Navy has “run out of money” to progress these contracts. Given the perilous state of the economy since Friday morning, will the Secretary of State give us an assurance that we will—please, please—run out of money for Trident as well?

Michael Fallon The Secretary of State for Defence
The schedule for the Type 26s has not yet been set. These ships are likely to cost between £500 million and £1 billion each, and I will not sign a contract for these ships until I am satisfied that they represent good value for the Royal Navy and good value for the taxpayer.

Written Answers to Questions – AWE Blacknest, Ministry of Defence, 21 June 2016

Paul Flynn Labour, Newport West
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, whether he plans to extend the remit of his Department’s Blacknest verification centre to verify nuclear disarmament and warhead dismantlement.

Philip Dunne Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Defence Procurement)
There are no plans to expand the remit of the Blacknest facility, which is primarily concerned with fulfilling the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty UK national data centre requirements.

Written Answers to Questions – Trident, Ministry of Defence, 21 June 2016

Deidre Brock Shadow SNP Westminster Group Leader (Scottish Parliament/Scottish Government Liaison), Shadow SNP Spokesperson (Devolved Government Relations)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what the annual cost is of safeguarding the Trident nuclear deterrent.

Philip Dunne Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Defence Procurement)
The Department does not cost the safeguarding and security of individual capabilities. Given the multi-layered make up of security arrangements protecting the deterrent, overlapping with those of wider defence personnel and capabilities, identifying accurate costs could be achieved only at disproportionate cost.

The in-service costs of the UK’s nuclear deterrent, including the costs of safeguarding, is estimated to be around six per cent of the annual defence budget.

Written Answers to Questions – Ministry of Defence Police: Trident, Ministry of Defence, 20 June 2016

Deidre Brock Shadow SNP Westminster Group Leader (Scottish Parliament/Scottish Government Liaison), Shadow SNP Spokesperson (Devolved Government Relations)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, how many Ministry of Defence Police officers are employed in safeguarding the Trident nuclear deterrent.

Mark Lancaster The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence
I am withholding the numbers of Ministry of Defence Police officers deployed to protect the Trident nuclear deterrent for the purpose of safeguarding national security.

Written Answers to Questions – Ministry of Defence Police: Trident, Ministry of Defence, 20 June 2016

Deidre Brock Shadow SNP Westminster Group Leader (Scottish Parliament/Scottish Government Liaison), Shadow SNP Spokesperson (Devolved Government Relations)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what assessment he has made of the effect of changes to the size of the workforce of the Ministry of Defence Police on (a) public safety and (b) safeguarding the Trident nuclear deterrent.

Mark Lancaster The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence
The safety and security at all of our nuclear facilities is of the upmost importance and the Ministry of Defence has several security providers which deliver this capability. Our arrangements are frequently tested and kept under continual review. We would never make changes that would place these in jeopardy.

Written Answers to Questions – Trident Missiles, Ministry of Defence, 17 June 2016

Steven Paterson Scottish National Party, Stirling
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what the budget is of the Mk4A upgrade programme.

Steven Paterson Scottish National Party, Stirling
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what the goal is of the Mk4A upgrade programme.

Steven Paterson Scottish National Party, Stirling
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, whether the Mk4A upgrade is expected to increase the yield of the warhead.

Steven Paterson Scottish National Party, Stirling
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, when work on the Mk4A upgrade programme began.

Steven Paterson Scottish National Party, Stirling
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, when the Mk4A upgrade is planned to come into service.

Steven Paterson Scottish National Party, Stirling
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what forecast he has made of by how long the Mk4A upgrade programme will extend the operational life of the current warhead.

Philip Dunne Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Defence Procurement)
The UK currently fields the Trident Mk4 warhead as part of the Trident Strategic Weapons System. In order to ensure continuity of the Mk4-based capability, the Mk4A Arming, Fuzing and Firing system is a non-nuclear component being introduced into the UK Trident warhead to replace a similar component. The Mk4A programme will not increase the destructive power of the warhead.

Approval to procure the new Arming, Firing and Fuzing mechanisms, to manage obsolescence in Mk4 and to adopt a Mk4A component was given in January 2006. I am withholding further details of the date of the Mk4A component’s entry into service, the cost of the Mk4A programme and the extension in operational life expected for the purposes of safeguarding national security.

Written Answers to Questions – Nuclear Disarmament, Ministry of Defence, 16 June 2016

Paul Flynn Labour, Newport West
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what methods are used to immobilise fissile material removed from dismantled nuclear warheads withdrawn from operational service; what that cost is of that immobilisation programme; and where that process is carried out.

Philip Dunne Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Defence Procurement)
The Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) stores and re-uses fissile material removed from dismantled nuclear warheads which have been withdrawn from operational service as part of routine stockpile management. This material is not immobilised.

Written Answers to Questions – Nuclear Weapons, Ministry of Defence, 16 June 2016

Paul Flynn Labour, Newport West
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, when his Department established the Nuclear Warhead Capability Sustainment Programme at the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE); who has been appointed as Senior Responsible Owner for that programme; who the key stakeholders for that programme are; how many scientists from the US national nuclear weapons laboratories are seconded to work on that programme; how many AWE scientists have visited the US national nuclear weapons laboratories as part of that programme; what that projected full cost of that programme is; how many scientists are working on that programme; how much has been spent on that programme to date; and what estimate he has made of the cost of that programme to completion.

Philip Dunne Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Defence Procurement)
The Nuclear Warhead Capability Sustainment Programme (NWCSP) commenced following an announcement on 19 July 2005 (Official report col 59WS). The current Senior Responsible Owner is Dr Paul Hollinshead. The key stakeholders in the NWCSP are the Ministry of Defence and the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE). Since 1 April 2008, financial planning for AWE has made no distinction between management and operation costs and those associated with the NWCSP. Expenditure at AWE since 2005 is as follows:

£ million at outturn prices
2005-06 493
2006-07 687
2007-08 894
2008-09 800
2009-10 870
2010-11 944
2011-12 941
2012-13 861
2013-14 961
2014-15 998

Spending plans beyond this Parliament will be set as part of the Government’s spending review process.

The NWCSP draws on the skills of all 5,000 AWE employees. No scientists from the US national nuclear weapons laboratories are seconded to the programme, but a US engineer and serviceman are seconded. The information on how many AWE scientists have visited the US national nuclear weapons laboratories as part of the programme is not held centrally and could be provided only at disproportionate cost.

Written Answers to Questions – Unmanned Marine Vehicles, Ministry of Defence, 14 June 2016

Douglas Chapman, Dunfermline and West Fife
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what steps his Department is taking to safeguard Royal Navy submarines from risks posed by underwater drones.

Mr Philip Dunne
The Government takes its responsibilities for maintaining the integrity of our submarine fleet extremely seriously and dedicates considerable resource to ensuring that the credibility and standards for operational effectiveness will continue to be met. Our submarine fleet will not be rendered obsolete by new technologies, including developments in unmanned underwater vehicle technology. I am withholding further details as publication would prejudice or would be likely to prejudice the capability, effectiveness or security of the Armed Forces.

Written Answers to Questions – Unmanned Marine Vehicles, Ministry of Defence, 14 June 2016

Douglas Chapman, Dunfermline and West Fife
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, whether his Department (a) has allocated and (b) plans to allocate resources to study the potential threat posed by unmanned underwater vehicles to the SSBN fleet.

Philip Dunne
The Government takes its responsibilities for maintaining the integrity of our submarine fleet extremely seriously and dedicates considerable resource to ensuring that the credibility and standards for operational effectiveness will continue to be met. Our submarine fleet will not be rendered obsolete by new technologies, including developments in unmanned underwater vehicle technology. I am withholding further details as publication would prejudice or would be likely to prejudice the capability, effectiveness or security of the Armed Forces.

Written Answers to Questions – Unmanned Marine Vehicles, Ministry of Defence, 13 June 2016

Douglas Chapman
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, whether the Royal Navy has deployed any unmanned maritime systems for the purpose of (a) anti-submarine and (b) port and harbour security.

Penny Mordaunt
The Royal Navy currently deploys unmanned systems to enhance maritime surveillance and improve situational awareness in a number of air and sea environments.
I am withholding further information as its disclosure would, or would be likely to, prejudice the capability, effectiveness or security of the Armed Forces.

Written Answers to Questions – Nuclear Submarines, Ministry of Defence, 9 June 2016

Graham Allen Labour, Nottingham North
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to the Answer of 25 May 2016 to Question 37663, if he will provide the hon. Member for Nottingham North with (a) details and (b) copies of the assessment which was used to assess the threats from emerging capabilities to nuclear submarines.

Philip Dunne Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Defence Procurement)
The Government takes its responsibilities for maintaining a credible independent nuclear deterrent extremely seriously and continually conducts assessments to ensure that the credibility and standards for operational effectiveness will continue to be met. I am withholding further details as publication would or would be likely to prejudice the capability, effectiveness or security of the Armed Forces.

Written Answers to Questions – Nuclear Disarmament, Ministry of Defence, 8 June 2016

Emily Thornberry Shadow Secretary of State for Defence
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, with reference to the Answer of 10 November 2015 to Question 14817, what progress the Government plans to make towards nuclear disarmament beyond the steps outlined in the Strategic Defence and Security Review 2010.

Philip Dunne Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Defence Procurement)
The UK is widely recognised as the most pro-active of the nuclear weapon states on nuclear disarmament. We remain committed to maintaining a minimum credible deterrent and we believe that our nuclear arsenal is the smallest of the five Nuclear Weapon States as recognised by the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We have reduced our nuclear forces by over half from their Cold War peak in the late 1970s. We reduced the number of deployed warheads on each submarine from 48 to 40 last year and we are reducing our overall stockpile to no more than 180 warheads by the mid-2020s. We possess around 1% of the total global stockpile of approximately 17,000 nuclear weapons.

In addition, the UK plays a leading role on disarmament verification with the US and Norway and continues to press for key steps towards multilateral disarmament, including the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and successful negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty in the Conference on Disarmament.

Written Answers to Questions – Trident Submarines, Ministry of Defence, 6 June 2016

Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb Green
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what is their estimate of the total cost of Trident renewal over the lifespan of the Successor-class submarines, including in-service costs and decommissioning.

Earl Howe The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence, Deputy Leader of the House of Lords
As stated in the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review, our latest cost estimate for manufacturing the four submarines of the Successor submarine programme is £31 billion, plus a contingency of £10 billion. This includes an assessment of the likely inflation over the lifetime of the programme and the risks appropriate for a project at this stage.

Once the new fleet of ballistic missile submarines comes into service, we expect that the in-service costs of the UK’s nuclear deterrent, which include the costs of the Atomic Weapons Establishment, basing and disposals, will be similar to the current system, at around six per cent of the defence budget.

While we have no plans to replace the current Trident D5 missile, we are participating with our US partners in a programme to extend their lifespan to the 2060s. The estimated cost is around £250 million.

Written Answers to Questions – Unmanned Marine Vehicles, Ministry of Defence, 25 May 2016

Graham Allen Labour, Nottingham North
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, whether his Department has made an assessment of the effect of the speed of development of unmanned underwater vehicles on the capability of Trident submarines to evade detection.

Philip Dunne Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Defence Procurement)
The submarines that carry our trident missiles will not be rendered obsolete by new technologies, including developments in unmanned underwater vehicle technology. We dedicate considerable resource to horizon scanning to assess the threats from emerging capabilities and will apply any necessary mitigations throughout the lifetime of both the Vanguard Class and the future Successor Class of nuclear deterrent submarines, to combat these future challenges. We assess that the ocean will remain a complex and challenging environment in which through the conduct of large scale anti-submarine warfare our adversaries may seek to threaten our submarines, despite advancements in technologies.

Written Answers to Questions – Trident Missiles, Ministry of Defence, 4 May 2016

Roger Godsiff Labour, Birmingham, Hall Green
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, whether it is technically possible for Trident missiles to be used by the UK without US knowledge and agreement.

Michael Fallon The Secretary of State for Defence
Yes. The UK’s nuclear deterrent is fully operationally independent.

Written Answers to Questions – Trident, Ministry of Defence, 4 May 2016

David Mackintosh Conservative, Northampton South
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what his Department’s timetable is for the renewal of Trident.

Michael Fallon The Secretary of State for Defence
The key elements of the UK Trident nuclear deterrent are the Vanguard-class submarines, the Trident D5 missile and the UK warhead. As set out in the Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, we expect the first Successor submarine to enter service in the early 2030s. A replacement warhead is not required until the late 2030s, possibly later. Given lead times, however, a decision on replacing the current warhead may be required later in this Parliament or early in the next. While we have no plans to replace the current Trident D5 missile, we are participating with our US partners in a programme to extend its current life to the 2060s.

Written Answers to Questions – Nuclear Weapons, Ministry of Defence, 27 April 2016

Paul Flynn Labour, Newport West
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what joint exercises his Department has held with participants from the US National Nuclear Security Administration on rapid response to emergency nuclear incidents, including those potentially involving terrorists, in the last 12 months.

Penny Mordaunt Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Minister for the Armed Forces)
The Ministry of Defence has been involved in four joint exercises related to nuclear incidents with the US National Nuclear Security Administration in the last 12 months. This included Exercise DIAMOND DRAGON 2015, a joint UK/US nuclear emergency exercise testing our response to an emergency involving US aircraft carrying US nuclear weapons in the UK. The other three exercises focused on countering nuclear terrorism.

Written Answers to Questions – Nuclear Weapons, Ministry of Defence, 27 April 2016

Paul Flynn Labour, Newport West
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what priority issues were discussed and conclusions reached at the UK-US bilateral annual stocktake of the UK-US Mutual Defence Agreement on atomic energy matters in April 2016; who attended that stocktake from which organisations; and what the cost was of that stocktake.

Philip Dunne Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Defence Procurement)
The UK/US Stocktake took place in April 2016 and was hosted by the Ministry of Defence (MOD). UK attendees were from the MOD and the Atomic Weapons Establishment and US attendees from the National Nuclear Security Administration, the Department of Defense, the US Air Force, the US Navy and Department of Energy Laboratories. No priority issues were discussed. As usual, technical and programme updates and discussions of collaborations took place. The costs were approximately £2500.

Written Answers to Questions – Trident Submarines, Ministry of Defence, 26 April 2016

Crispin Blunt Chair, Foreign Affairs Committee
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, whether his Department’s capital programme prepared for Budget 2016 included revised estimates for the Trident Successor project.

Crispin Blunt Chair, Foreign Affairs Committee
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what recent estimate he has made of the capital costs of (a) replacing the Vanguard fleet with four new Successor submarines and (b) other foreseeable elements within the Trident renewal project up to the late 2030’s.

Philip Dunne Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Defence Procurement)
As stated in the Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, our latest estimate is that manufacturing the four Successor submarines is likely to cost a total of £31 billion, including inflation over the lifetime of the programme. We will also set a contingency of £10 billion. The MOD budget for the Spending Review period published in Budget 2016 included this latest estimate for the relevant period.

Oral Answers to Questions – Successor Ballistic Missile Submarines, Ministry of Defence, 18 April 2016

James Cartlidge Conservative, South Suffolk 12:00 am, 18th April 2016
What assessment he has made of the effects on the UK’s (a) economy and (b) security of building four Successor ballistic missile submarines.

Philip Dunne Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Defence Procurement)
As my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State indicated earlier, the nuclear deterrent is at the apex of the UK’s full spectrum of defence capability. The UK’s defence nuclear enterprise is gearing up to deliver the successor to the Vanguard class submarines. Last month we announced a further £642 million of preparatory work ahead of the investment decision for this £31 billion programme. That investment in Successor submarines will not only help keep Britain safe but support over 30,000 jobs across the UK.

James Cartlidge Conservative, South Suffolk
With Russia openly menacing our allies, and with us on the cusp of the centenary of the greatest sacrifices ever made by our armed forces in defending this country, would it not be foolish and totally inappropriate for us no longer to be prepared to make a relatively small financial sacrifice to maintain the only asset that can guarantee the freedom of this country?

Philip Dunne Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Defence Procurement)
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. As the Secretary of State indicated in his speech on nuclear deterrence before Easter, we have both a political and a moral responsibility to protect our people and allies. The nuclear deterrent is a sign to NATO, and as a leading member of NATO we cannot and should not outsource our commitments to others. There has been broad political consensus for decades in this House on the need to maintain the UK’s independent strategic deterrent. Government Members are clear where we stand. This remains the official policy of Her Majesty’s official Opposition, and it is in our view irresponsible that Emily Thornberry and her leader appear determined to put the ultimate security of our nation at risk.

John Spellar Labour, Warley
The Minister and, indeed, the Secretary of State have referred to the long-held and well-known views of the Leader of the Opposition on this issue, but it is the Secretary of State and the Prime Minister who will put the resolution to the House. Given that there is overwhelming support for the renewal from the Ministry of Defence, the forces, industry, the workforce and the majority of this House, will the Minister get the message through to dithering Dave in No. 10 to stop playing party politics with this issue of national security and to put the vote to this House?

Philip Dunne Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Defence Procurement)
The right hon. Gentleman, who speaks with some knowledge on these matters, has given a strong indication to the House that there will be a broad measure of support, which we thoroughly welcome. I will offer the Prime Minister his advice.

Ben Howlett Conservative, Bath
Two weeks ago I had the great privilege of visiting Rolls-Royce up the road in Bristol, where I met apprentices and workers at the defence aerospace operations and turbine manufacturing facility. I witnessed the important work that Rolls-Royce is doing around the country on manufacturing nuclear engines for servicing naval vessels. Does the Minister agree that Trident stands to benefit the economy by virtue of the many jobs it will create?

Philip Dunne Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Defence Procurement)
I thank my hon. Friend for highlighting the fact that that programme will benefit not just those folks working for Rolls-Royce in various plants, particularly around Derby, or those employees of BAE Systems, the prime contractor, but companies in constituencies right across the breadth of this country, including his own.

Written Answers to Questions – Trident Submarines: Iron and Steel, Ministry of Defence, 18 April 2016

Emily Thornberry Shadow Secretary of State for Defence
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, with which suppliers his Department has contracted to provide steel for construction of the Successor submarine.

Philip Dunne Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Defence Procurement)
BAE Systems (BAES) is the prime contractor for the majority of the Successor programme. As prime contractor, BAES will sub-contract suppliers of steel and related services.

Separately, Missile Tubes for the Common Missile Compartment are being produced jointly with the US and steel procurement will be carried out by US contractor General Dynamics Electric Boat.

Written Answers to Questions – Trident Submarines, Ministry of Defence, 18 April 2016

Emily Thornberry Shadow Secretary of State for Defence
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, whether his Department has updated estimates of the cost of the Successor submarine programme since the publication of the Strategic
Philip Dunne Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Defence Procurement)
No. As stated in the Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, our latest estimate is that manufacturing the four Successor submarines is likely to cost a total of £31 billion, including inflation over the lifetime of the programme. We will also set a contingency of £10 billion.

Oral Answers to Questions – Trident, Ministry of Defence, 18 April 2016

Drew Hendry Shadow SNP Westminster Group Leader (Transport) 12:00 am, 18th April 2016
What discussions he has had with the Leader of the House on the timetable for a vote in the House on replacement of the Trident missile submarines.

Michael Fallon The Secretary of State for Defence
As my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister made clear on 10 February, we will bring forward a debate and vote in the House at the appropriate moment, and announce it in the usual way.

Drew Hendry Shadow SNP Westminster Group Leader (Transport)
Can the Minister tell the House where Trident falls in value terms in regard to the cost-benefit ratio using the Government’s own standard appraisal mechanism? Can he confirm that an appraisal has been conducted, and will he make it available to Members in the Commons Library?

Michael Fallon The Secretary of State for Defence
I will of course make available what figures I can to the hon. Gentleman, but let me be clear that the overall cost of the Successor programme was set out in the strategic defence and security review that we published in November. It is £31 billion, which should be seen in the context of a deterrent that will serve us for over 30 years.

Julian Lewis Chair, Defence Committee
It is an open secret that the Ministry of Defence wanted this debate to take place in the spring, so I do not blame the Secretary of State for the fact that it has not happened. However, he is on record as saying that people are worried about the wavering position of the Labour Opposition on this matter. Would it not assist us to restore bipartisanship to the issue if the debate were to be brought forward, at least to before the Labour party’s conference, or do the Government—by which I mean No. 10—prefer dissension at a Labour party conference to bipartisanship on a particularly important issue?

Michael Fallon The Secretary of State for Defence
Well, no. The position is that in November we announced our commitment to replacing the existing four Vanguard submarines, and we would like that principle to be endorsed by a vote in this House. I would obviously like that vote to take place as soon as possible, respecting of course the periods of purdah that will exist this spring and summer.

John Woodcock Labour/Co-operative, Barrow and Furness
Does the Secretary of State understand that, unlike some on the Opposition Benches, we will not allow any individual questions over cost—valid though they might be in and of themselves—to be used as an excuse to wriggle out of our commitment to the British people? Those who remain true to the spirit of Attlee will do the right thing for Britain.

Michael Fallon The Secretary of State for Defence
I am very glad to hear that. I would certainly caution the Labour party against moving away from the moderate mainstream support for a deterrent that every previous Labour Government have expressed. Indeed, I note that the advisers of Emily Thornberry told journalists that her review would be fudged, as the

“last thing we want…is another reason for those who oppose Jeremy to call for him to go”.

The hon. Lady seems to be the only person who thinks that defending our country means defending the Labour leader.

Andrew Bridgen Chair, Regulatory Reform Committee
Can my right hon. Friend confirm that the Trident alternatives review concluded that there was no credible or affordable alternative to a Trident-based nuclear deterrent?

Michael Fallon The Secretary of State for Defence
Yes. The alternatives were looked at exhaustively as part of the Trident alternatives review three years ago, and I set out the principal arguments as to why we are making this replacement in a speech to Policy Exchange on 23 March.

Kevan Jones Labour, North Durham
Last Monday, I had the privilege of visiting Rolls-Royce in Derby, which is working on the Successor programme, and meeting members of the unions and the management. The one thing that they all want is certainty on the decision on this programme and on provision for the future. Does the Secretary of State agree that any notion that we would have an easy option to cancel the programme at some point in the future—say, at the next general election—would be disastrous not only for our defence but for the workforces in Derby and other places that are reliant on it?

Michael Fallon The Secretary of State for Defence
It would be disastrous for our defence and for jobs in this country. It would also be disastrous for our relationship with all our principal allies. Let me be very clear that this programme is already going ahead. We have spent nearly £4 billion, as authorised by the House, on the Successor programme. Work is under way in Barrow, in Derby and in a number of other locations across the country, including those in Scotland, and the programme is already employing several thousand people in small companies.

Emily Thornberry Shadow Secretary of State for Defence
The Minister for Defence Procurement wrote in November 2014:

“The security requirement to source and sustain certain capabilities within the UK—for instance nuclear submarines…means that single source procurement is and will remain a significant activity… The taxpayer is entitled to know that this money is being spent properly…That is why the Single Source Regulations Office (SSRO) has been established”.

So can the Secretary of State please tell the House how many meetings his Department has had so far with the SSRO about the Successor programme?

Michael Fallon The Secretary of State for Defence
I am very happy to write to the hon. Lady about the number of meetings that may or may not have taken place. Let me be clear, however, that the programme is now under way and it is time she made up her mind as to whether she will support it or will we be taking a message to our allies, including the President of the United States, who visits on Friday, that the Opposition are no longer prepared to support a deterrent that they have always supported in the past?

John Bercow Speaker of the House of Commons, Chair, Speaker’s Committee for the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority
I dare say that we will find out who thinks what when the vote comes.

Emily Thornberry Shadow Secretary of State for Defence
I asked the Secretary of State specifically about the SSRO and the Successor programme. I appreciate that he does not know the answer, so let me tell him that there have been no meetings—I have a letter here from the Ministry of Defence. The SSRO was tasked with saving at least £200 million last year through its scrutiny of MOD contracts. However, because the Secretary of State will not allow it to do its job properly, it has agreed savings of only £100,000. Why is it not being allowed to scrutinise the Successor contract? Is it because, as the Department has said:

“The government needs a safe space away from the public gaze to allow it to consider policy options…
unfettered from public comment about” their “affordability”? That is not good enough. We demand that the Secretary of State reverse the decision and open up the Successor programme to the independent scrutiny that it requires.

Michael Fallon The Secretary of State for Defence
The hon. Lady appears to misunderstand completely the function of the Single Source Regulations Office, which is to supervise contracts once they are signed. This particular contract is still under negotiation, and I am certainly not going to go into the details with her or, indeed, in the House until it is signed. Once it is signed, we will of course ensure that it is properly scrutinised.

All Written Answers – Trident, Ministry of Defence, 11 April 2016

Crispin Blunt Chair, Foreign Affairs Committee
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, when his Department last carried out an assessment of the whole life cost of the Successor programme.

Crispin Blunt Chair, Foreign Affairs Committee
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what his Department’s latest estimate is of (a) the whole life programme cost of the Successor programme, (b) capital costs associated with (i) submarine acquisition, (ii) Trident missile renewal and (iii) basing facilities, (c) the running and support costs of the Successor fleet and associated capability to protect and sustain it, (d) all future costs associated with the Atomic Weapons Establishment maintaining a capability to maintain an on-going nuclear warhead design capability and (e) decommissioning costs.

Philip Dunne Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Defence Procurement)
An error has been identified in the written answer given on 23 October 2015.

The correct answer should have been:
The 2014 Update to Parliament The May 2011 Initial Gate Parliamentary Report set out an estimate for the Successor submarine acquisition of around £25 billion, based on a four boat solution, spread over some 25 years. These estimates are currently being refreshed to inform the Comprehensive Spending Review and Strategic Defence and Security Review.

Once the new fleet of SSBNs come into service, we expect that the in-service costs of the UK’s nuclear deterrent, which include the costs of the Atomic Weapons Establishment, basing and disposals, will be similar to the current system, at around six per cent of the defence budget.

While we have no plans to replace the current Trident D5 missile, we are participating with our US partners in a programme to extend the current life to the 2060s. The estimated cost is around £250 million.

All Written Answers – Military Exercises, Ministry of Defence, 29 March 2016

Dan Jarvis Labour, Barnsley Central
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, which military exercises UK armed forces have been involved in that have (a) included other EU member states and (b) been EU-led.

Penny Mordaunt Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Minister for the Armed Forces)
Exercises with international Allies and partners are critical to improving our Armed Forces’ interoperability on deployment and enhancing collective Defence through NATO. Last year we saw an excellent example of this in NATO’s Exercise Trident Juncture, the biggest military exercise in 10 years. Although the EU does not lead large scale military operations like NATO, it does support the interoperability of our Armed Forces through its battlegroup framework and small scale exercises led by its Member States. The UK will hold the leadership of the battlegroup in the second half of this year.

All Written Answers – Nuclear Submarines: Decommissioning, Ministry of Defence, 21 March 2016

Brendan O’Hara Shadow SNP Westminster Group Leader (Defence)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, how many submissions his Department received to its consultation on the Submarine Dismantling Project: site for the interim storage of Intermediate Level radioactive Waste.

Brendan O’Hara Shadow SNP Westminster Group Leader (Defence)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, how many submissions from local (a) residents and (b) businesses his Department received to its consultation on the Submarine Dismantling Project: site for the interim storage of Intermediate Level radioactive Waste.

Philip Dunne Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Defence Procurement)
A total of 170 responses were received as part of the Submarine Dismantling Project Public Consultation, in respect of interim storage of Intermediate Level radioactive Waste. With the exception of 18 received from instituitions, responses were anonymous and it is not possible to differentiate between residents and businesses.

All Written Answers – Nuclear Submarines: Decommissioning, Ministry of Defence, 21 March 2016

Brendan O’Hara Shadow SNP Westminster Group Leader (Defence)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, when his Department plans to publish its consultation on the Submarine Dismantling Project: site for the interim storage of Intermediate Level radioactive Waste.

Philip Dunne Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Defence Procurement)
The Submarine Dismantling Project Response to Consultation Report is due to be published in the middle of this year

All Written Answers – Trident Submarines, Ministry of Defence, 16 March 2016

Paul Flynn Labour, Newport West
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, whether his Department has made an assessment of the relevance of the Final Report of the US Defense Science Board Task Force on Resilient Military Systems, published on 10 October 2012, to the security of Trident submarines.

Philip Dunne Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Defence Procurement)
The Ministry of Defence are aware of the report in question which has not alerted us to anything new. We continue to place a high priority on assuring the effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent and managing the associated risk. We continue to monitor and evaluate capabilities and technologies that could threaten the nuclear deterrent, including from cyber-attack. It would not be appropriate to go into specific detail of the steps taken to mitigate against these threats but note that the report points out that submarine platforms have isolation “designed into how they operate and fight” and that this isolation provides nuclear armed submarines with additional resilience over other nuclear weapon systems.

All Written Answers – Trident Submarines: Finance, Ministry of Defence, 16 March 2016

Paul Flynn Labour, Newport West
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, with reference to the Written Statement of 3 March 2016, HCWS576, on Successor Submarine Assessment Phase, whether the sum of £642 million expenditure announced represents new expenditure over and above that originally budgeted for the Assessment Phase; whether that sum includes any money which has been the subject of earlier press announcements by his Department; and which projects of what value that sum has been allocated to fund.

Philip Dunne Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Defence Procurement)
As announced in my Written Statement of 3 March 2016, HCWS576, the funding will supplement the Successor submarine programme Assessment Phase, taking that investment to £3.9 billion. The additional investment covers activity for Nuclear Propulsion systems, Facilities and Infrastructure, the Common Missile Compartment and submarine Design, including Design Assurance. All of the projects have previously been announced. I am withholding cost estimates as to release them would prejudice commercial interests.

All Written Answers – Nuclear Weapons: Transport, Ministry of Defence, 8 March 2016

Owen Thompson SNP Whip
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what guidance is issued under the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001 to homes along the route of convoys transporting nuclear weapons.

Penny Mordaunt Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Minister for the Armed Forces)
The Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001 apply to areas, defined in each case by the Office for Nuclear Regulation, surrounding nuclear sites. The regulations do not apply to road transport and therefore no guidance is issued.

All Written Answers -Trident Submarines, Ministry of Defence, 7 March 2016

Kate Hollern Shadow Minister (Defence)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what assessment he has made of whether additional investment to that already announced will be required during the stage 2 design process for the Successor programme.

Philip Dunne Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Defence Procurement)
As I announced on 3 March 2016 (Official Report, columns 45-46WS) we are investing a further £642 million in the design phase of the Successor submarine. This is part of the staged investment approach announced in the Strategic Defence and Security Review.

Successor Submarine Assessment Phase (Word Document, 23.32 KB)

All Written Answers -Trident Submarines, Ministry of Defence, 7 March 2016

Kate Hollern Shadow Minister (Defence)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to the Answer of 29 February 2016 to Question 28346, on Trident submarines, what the agreed limits of liability are.

Philip Dunne Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Defence Procurement)
The agreed limit of liability is £1.4 billion.

Ministerial Written Statement -Successor Submarine Assessment Phase, Ministry of Defence, 3 March 2016

Philip Dunne Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Defence Procurement)
The Government was elected with a manifesto commitment to build a new fleet of four Successor ballistic missile submarines. On 23 November 2015, the Government announced in the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) that the Successor Submarine Programme would cost £31 billion, and that the first boat was expected to enter service in the early 2030s. We will also set a contingency of £10 billion.

As part of his statement on the SDSR, the Prime Minister announced that we needed to implement a number of changes to the Successor Submarine Programme, which included plans to invest more than £600 million in the design phase.

I am today confirming our plans to invest £642 million to supplement the current Successor Assessment Phase of £3.3 billion. This will bring the total Assessment Phase commitment to £3.9 billion as announced in the SDSR, and will provide a sound foundation for the next phase where we will be taking a staged investment approach.

The Assessment Phase has identified the need to invest now to prepare for an efficient and effective submarine build. The £642 million will be spent on facilities at BAE Systems in Barrow, essential long lead items for the four submarines and the nuclear propulsion programme.

In the UK, a number of key suppliers directly support the delivery of the Successor Submarine Programme who, in turn, depend heavily on a network of hundreds of sub-contractors. The Government’s further investment in preparation for a four boat Successor fleet should be welcomed by all suppliers as helping to secure vital skills for the UK in the long term.

All Written Answers – Russia, Ministry of Defence, 3 March 2016

Toby Perkins Shadow Minister (Defence)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what assessment he has made of the military threat to the UK posed by Russia.

Penny Mordaunt Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Minister for the Armed Forces)
As noted in the Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, Russia is mid-way through a programme of major investment to modernise and upgrade its military, including its nuclear forces. Its behaviour will continue to be hard to predict, and, though highly unlikely, we cannot rule out the possibility that it may feel tempted to act aggressively against NATO Allies.

All Written Answers – Nuclear Power: Accidents, Ministry of Defence, 3 March 2016

Owen Thompson SNP Whip
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what guidance is issued to households on dealing with a nuclear incident.

Penny Mordaunt Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Minister for the Armed Forces)
In accordance with the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001 (REPPIR) households in the area likely to be affected by a nuclear emergency, are provided with prior information to ensure they are properly informed and prepared in the unlikely event of an emergency occurring.

All Written Answers – Trident Submarines, Ministry of Defence, 2 March 2016

Kate Hollern Shadow Minister (Defence)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what proportion of the elements of the Successor programme has commenced production of manufacturing drawings; and when he expects all elements of that to have commenced such drawing.

Philip Dunne Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Defence Procurement)
The production of manufacturing drawings is phased to support corresponding manufacturing activities and has commenced for long-lead elements of the Successor submarine including the propulsion plant and missile tubes.

Production of the majority of manufacturing drawings will not commence until after the next approval.

All Written Answers – Trident Submarines, Ministry of Defence, 1 March 2016

Kate Hollern Shadow Minister (Defence)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what the forecast expenditure is on the Successor programme within his Department’s 10 year equipment plan.

Philip Dunne Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Defence Procurement)
The Successor submarine programme remains in the Assessment Phase. I am withholding internal Ministry Of Defence forecasts on future programme expenditure as disclosure would or would be likely to prejudice the Department’s commercial interests.

All Written Answers – Trident Submarines, Ministry of Defence, 1 March 2016

Kate Hollern Shadow Minister (Defence)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what proportion of the elements of the Successor programme have commenced Stage 2; and when he expects all elements of that programme to have commenced Stage 2.

Philip Dunne Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Defence Procurement)
Every element of the Successor Programme has now commenced Stage 2 design.

All Written Answers – Trident Submarines, Ministry of Defence, 1 March 2016

Kate Hollern Shadow Minister (Defence)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what the next three stages are in the investment programme announced in the Strategic Defence and Security Review for the Successor programme; and when he expects each of those stages will reach approval decisions.

Philip Dunne Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Defence Procurement)
As set out in the Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, we will further invest around £600 million in the design of the Successor submarine as we prepare to move to the demonstration phase. Options for the subsequent investment stages and their scope, time and cost are currently under consideration and will be subject to the formal approvals process

All Written Answers – Nuclear Enterprise Board, Ministry of Defence, 1 March 2016

Kate Hollern Shadow Minister (Defence)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, who the members of the nuclear enterprise board are; what the terms of reference are of that board; how many times that board has met since January 2015; and how that board reports to ministers.

Philip Dunne Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Defence Procurement)
Membership of the Defence Nuclear Executive Board consists of the:

Permanent Secretary

Vice Chief of the Defence Staff

Director General Finance

Director General Security Policy

Deputy Chief of Defence Staff Military Capability

Chief Scientific Advisor

Fleet Commander

The Terms of Reference for the Board are currently being reviewed. The Board sits quarterly and has met four times since January 2015; it reports to Ministers via the Defence Board.

All Written Answers – Trident Submarines, 16 February 2016

Emily Thornberry Shadow Secretary of State for Defence
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, when he expects the (a) demonstration phase and (b) manufacture phase of the Successor submarine programme to begin.

Penny Mordaunt Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Minister for the Armed Forces)
We expect to approve the next stage of the Successor submarine programme later in 2016.

All Written Answers – Military Exercises: Nuclear Weapons, 16 February 2016

Brendan O’Hara Shadow SNP Westminster Group Leader (Defence)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what (a) atmospheric stability class was assumed for the downwind dispersion and deposition of the release fall-out; and what the assumed distribution and gross area of ground and surface contamination was in terms of contours versed in Becqueral per square metre in each Astral exercise between February 2011 and November 2012.

Penny Mordaunt Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Minister for the Armed Forces)
I am withholding the requested information as its disclosure would or would be likely to prejudice national security and international relations.

All Written Answers – Military Exercises: Nuclear Weapons, 16 February 2016

Brendan O’Hara Shadow SNP Westminster Group Leader (Defence)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, whether an assessment was made of the (a) decontamination, (b) environmental and (c) other costs was before each Astral exercise between February 2011 and November 2012; and what the incremental cost was of each of the major elements for managing the post-incident contamination.

Brendan O’Hara Shadow SNP Westminster Group Leader (Defence)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what the nature and quantity was of the nuclear materials released in terms of (a) its physical state, (b) its mass quantity, (c) the release fraction assumed for each transportation package and (d) the total released radioactivity in Becquerels for each Astral exercise between February 2011 and November 2012.

Brendan O’Hara Shadow SNP Westminster Group Leader (Defence)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, which agency or organisation undertook the release dispersion and deposition modelling and radiological dose assessment of each Astral exercise between February 2011 and November 2012.

Brendan O’Hara Shadow SNP Westminster Group Leader (Defence)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what the estimated radiological dose uptake was in terms of (a) individual whole equivalent dose in milli-Sievert and (b) collective dose in man-Sievert for (i) Services and his Department’s civilian personnel involved in and responding to the incident, (ii) civilian emergency services personnel responders attending and (iii) members of the public during each Astral exercise between February 2011 and November 2012.

Brendan O’Hara Shadow SNP Westminster Group Leader (Defence)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, whether each Astral exercise between February 2011 and November 2012 assumed a post-incident release of nuclear materials from the transportation packages.

Mordaunt Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Minister for the Armed Forces)
The Ministry of Defence maintains a Defence Nuclear Emergency Organisation (NEO) to respond in the unlikely event of an emergency involving the transport of defence nuclear materials. The NEO organises regular exercises to test the effectiveness of its emergency response planning and arrangements. These include the Astral series of exercises, which are designed to be challenging, and thus simulate the extremely unlikely event of a release of radioactive material from the transport containers. No radioactive materials are used or released to the environment during the exercises. The specific exercise objectives do not require assessments or estimates of decontamination, environmental or other post-incident decontamination costs or of radiological dose uptakes. The Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) undertook the modelling for each Astral exercise between February 2011 and November 2012.

I am withholding information about the physical state, mass quantity, release fraction and total released radioactivity assumed for these exercises as disclosure would or would be likely to prejudice national security.

All Written Answers – Nuclear Weapons: Transport, 15 February 2016

Margaret Ferrier Shadow SNP Spokesperson (Scotland Office)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to the Answer of 29 January 2016 to Question 23641, which of the five findings contained in the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator assessment of Exercise Senator 2011 has not been formally closed out.

Philip Dunne Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Defence Procurement)
The finding not yet formally closed out in the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator (DNSR) assessment of Exercise Senator 2011 called for a review of the hazard assessment for the transport operation. This is to ensure that protection measures remain proportionate to the risk and continue to be based on up-to-date scientific and regulatory advice. DNSR continues to have confidence in the adequacy of the arrangements currently in place, as has been demonstrated at emergency response exercises, but believes it is timely to conduct a review.

We currently expect the finding to be closed out within the next 12 months.

All Written Answers – Radioactive Materials: Transport, 9 February 2016

Owen Thompson SNP Whip
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, whose decision it was to cease displaying radioactive material hazard signs on vehicles carrying special nuclear materials.

Owen Thompson SNP Whip
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, on what date the decision to cease displaying radioactive material hazard signs on vehicles carrying special nuclear materials was made.

Owen Thompson SNP Whip
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what changes to operating arrangements were made as a result of the decision to cease displaying radioactive material hazard signs on vehicles carrying special nuclear materials to ensure that relevant information is available to emergency services in the event of an accident.

Owen Thompson SNP Whip
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, for what reasons the decision was taken to cease displaying radioactive material hazard signs on vehicles carrying special nuclear materials.

Owen Thompson SNP Whip
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what advice his Department sought from where on the decision as to whether to cease displaying radioactive material hazard signs on vehicles carrying special nuclear materials.

Penny Mordaunt Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Minister for the Armed Forces)
The Defence Equipment and Support organisation decided to cease displaying radioactive material hazard warning signs on vehicles carrying special nuclear materials in July 2011. Before implementing this decision we sought legal advice and notified the regulator. The change was implemented in 2012 in anticipation of the transition to a single type of vehicle for the transport of both nuclear weapons and special nuclear materials and was needed in order to maintain the policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons. No changes were required to operating arrangements as a result of this decision. The Ministry of Defence’s arrangements for the safe transport of defence nuclear materials include the provision of information to the emergency services in the event of an incident; this does not rely on displaying radioactive material hazard warning signs.

All Written Answers – Russia: NATO, Ministry of Defence, 4 February 2016

Jim Shannon Shadow DUP Spokesperson (Health), Shadow DUP Spokesperson (Transport), Shadow DUP Spokesperson (Equality)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what recent discussions the Government has had with NATO on reductions to the number of Russian nuclear strike missiles.

Mark Lancaster The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence
My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence (Michael Fallon) has had no recent discussions with NATO regarding reductions to the number of Russian nuclear strike missiles. However, the US provides annual reports on progress made under the Treaty for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, which is known as the New START Treaty.

All Written Answers – Trident Missiles: Costs, Ministry of Defence, 3 February 2016

Caroline Lucas Green, Brighton, Pavilion
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what the costs are of the Mk4A Trident warhead modification programme for each year of the Nuclear Warhead Capability Sustainment Programme.

Michael Fallon The Secretary of State for Defence
The overall cost to the UK of procuring the Mk4A component was an element of the estimated future costs of the Atomic Weapons Establishment as set out in chapter five of the White Paper ‘The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent’ (Cmd 6994), published in December 2006.

Further details on the costs of the Mk4A programme are being withheld for the purpose of safeguarding national security.

All Written Answers – Trident Submarines: Finance, Ministry of Defence, 2 February 2016

Kate Hollern Shadow Minister (Defence)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what steps his Department has taken to ensure that the contingency fund for the new generation of Successor Trident submarines has been calculated in compliance with HM Treasury Green Book guidance.

Kate Hollern Shadow Minister (Defence)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what steps his Department has taken to ensure that calculation of cost estimates for the new generation of Successor Trident submarines has taken into account optimism bias in compliance with the HM Treasury Green Book and supplementary guidance.

Philip Dunne Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Defence Procurement)
Successor cost estimates take into account optimism bias in a way consistent with Green Book guidance.

As announced in the Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, the level of contingency represents around 35% of the submarine cost to completion. This is a prudent estimate based on past experience of large, complex projects, such as the 2012 Olympics.

The cost estimates have been subjected to, and will continue to be the exposed to, rigorous cross-Government scrutiny.

All Written Answers – Trident: Employment, Ministry of Defence, 1 February 2016

Caroline Lucas Green, Brighton, Pavilion
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what the most recent estimate is that his Department has made of (a) civilian public sector, (b) civilian private sector and (c) military personnel working (i) directly on and (ii) in the supply chain of the Trident nuclear weapon system.

Caroline Lucas Green, Brighton, Pavilion
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what the most recent estimate is that his Department has made of (a) civilian public sector, (b) civilian private sector and (c) military personnel working (i) directly on and (ii) in the supply chain of the Successor submarine programme.

Kevan Jones Labour, North Durham
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what estimate his Department has made of the number of jobs in each region and part of the UK that (a) have been and (b) will be created by the Successor submarine programme.

Philip Dunne Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Defence Procurement)
The nuclear deterrent is the cornerstone of the UK’s defence security policy. Maintaining the UK’s defence nuclear enterprise supports over 30,000 jobs across the UK and makes a significant contribution to the economy.

In the UK, four key suppliers directly support the delivery of the Trident programme. The Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) managed and operated by AWE Management Limited is based in Aldermaston and Burghfield; BAE Systems Maritime-Submarines at Barrow-in-Furness; Babcock at Devonport; and Rolls-Royce at Raynesway, Derby. There are thousands of jobs sustained across these sites.

There are also 6,800 Ministry of Defence (MOD) civilian and Royal Navy jobs at Her Majesty’s Naval Base Clyde including contractors from Babcock, Lockheed Martin UK and Rolls-Royce. This figure is due to grow to 8,200 in the 2020s. Rolls-Royce also operate the site at the Vulcan Naval Reactor Test Establishment, Dounreay, supporting the Trident programme and other nuclear-powered submarines. Also the Defence Equipment and Support’s military and defence civilian personnel are based at MOD Abbey Wood and other sites in the UK.

The ability of these key areas to deliver their programmes depends heavily on an extensive network of sub-contractors who are working indirectly in support of the Trident programme.

All Written Answers – Trident Submarines: Finance, Ministry of Defence, 29 January 2016

Kate Hollern Shadow Minister (Defence)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, whether the contingency fund for the new generation of successor Trident submarines was based on a full quantitative risk assessment of the project.

Philip Dunne Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Defence Procurement)
As set out in the Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, we have set a contingency of £10 billion, which represents around 35% of the cost to completion. This is a prudent estimate based on past experience of large, complex projects, such as the 2012 Olympics.

All Written Answers – Trident Submarines: Decommissioning, Ministry of Defence, 28 January 2016

Neil Gray Shadow SNP Spokesperson (Fair Work and Employment)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what the most recent estimate is that his Department has made of the (a) civilian public sector, (b) civilian private sector and (c) military personnel required to work on the decommissioning of the Vanguard class submarines; and how many of those workers will be employed on decommissioning.

Philip Dunne Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Defence Procurement)
The UK’s Vanguard Class submarines will begin to leave service by the early 2030s as the Successor submarines are introduced into service. The detailed planning necessary for this work has yet to commence and it is not therefore possible at this time to make an assessment of the workforce that will be required.

All Written Answers – Nuclear Weapons: Decommissioning, Ministry of Defence, 27 January 2016

Paul Flynn Labour, Newport West
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what the Government’s policy is on further developing the necessary facilities and skills for the UK to become a world centre of expertise in the dismantling of formerly-armed nuclear warheads.

Michael Fallon The Secretary of State for Defence
As we set out in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review, we will reduce the overall stockpile of nuclear warheads to no more than 180 by the mid 2020s. The Government is investing in the Atomic Weapons Establishment, which is responsible for supporting the entire life-cycle of the UK’s nuclear warheads, from design and manufacture, to maintenance and certification of the existing warhead stockpile, and, ultimately, to decommissioning and disposal. In addition, the UK is co-operating with international partners – particularly the US and Norway – on a verification regime for the dismantlement of a nuclear weapon that could support any potential future nuclear disarmament treaty.

All Written Answers – Rolls-Royce Marine Power Operations, Ministry of Defence, 26 January 2016

Toby Perkins Shadow Minister (Defence)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what assessment he has made of whether Rolls Royce will complete the Nuclear Reactor Component of the Successor Programme on schedule; and if he will make a statement.

Philip Dunne Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Defence Procurement)
I refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave him on 20 January 2016 to Question 22344.

Nuclear Submarines (Word Document, 14.38 KB)

All Written Answers – Rolls-Royce Marine Power Operations, Ministry of Defence, 26 January 2016

Toby Perkins Shadow Minister (Defence)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what recent representations he has received in favour of Government involvement in any part of the running of departments or divisions of Rolls Royce connected to that company’s production of the Nuclear Reactor Component of the Successor Programme.

Philip Dunne Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Defence Procurement)
The Ministry of Defence has received no such representations.

All Written Answers – Radioactive Materials: Scotland, Ministry of Defence, 25 January 2016

Douglas Chapman Scottish National Party, Dunfermline and West Fife
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what safety and contingency measures his Department puts in place before nuclear materials are transported on roads in Scotland.

Douglas Chapman Scottish National Party, Dunfermline and West Fife
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, how the movement of nuclear materials on roads in Scotland by his Department is supervised and regulated.

Penny Mordaunt Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Minister for the Armed Forces)
The transport of Defence Nuclear Material is regulated by the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator according to the provisions of Joint Service Publication 538, Regulation of the Nuclear Weapon Programme, available at: http://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/341332/20140801_JSP_538_V3_1_Pt_1.pdf

A wide range of safety and contingency measures are in place to ensure the safety of nuclear convoy operations. These are summarised in the Local Authority and Emergency Service Information document available at: http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/local-authority-emergency-services-information.

All Written Answers – Radioactive Materials: Scotland, Ministry of Defence, 25 January 2016

Douglas Chapman Scottish National Party, Dunfermline and West Fife
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what advisory notices of movements of nuclear material by road in Scotland his Department gives to (a) the Scottish Government and (b) Scottish local authorities in advance of any such movements.

Penny Mordaunt Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Minister for the Armed Forces)
The Scottish Government and local authorities are not given advance notice of movements that involve Defence nuclear material.

Police forces are always notified in advance of a convoy being routed through their area. Police may advise fire and rescue services of the presence of the convoy if it is moving into the vicinity of a fire service operation.

All Written Answers – Radioactive Materials: Scotland, Ministry of Defence, 25 January 2016

Douglas Chapman Scottish National Party, Dunfermline and West Fife
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, how many movements of nuclear material there have been on roads in Scotland in each of the last five years.

Douglas Chapman Scottish National Party, Dunfermline and West Fife
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what road routes have been used for the movement of nuclear materials in Scotland in each of the last five years.

Penny Mordaunt Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Minister for the Armed Forces)
It is Ministry of Defence policy not to comment upon the frequency or routes used by nuclear material convoys, as to do so would, or would be likely to, prejudice national security. Nuclear material convoy movements are kept to the minimum necessary to maintain the operational effectiveness of the UK’s nuclear deterrent.

All Written Answers – Nuclear Submarines, Ministry of Defence, 20 January 2016

Toby Perkins Shadow Minister (Defence)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what contingency plans the Government has in place should Rolls Royce be unable to complete the Nuclear Reactor Component of the Successor Programme on schedule.

Philip Dunne Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Defence Procurement)
We work closely with all of our key suppliers to ensure they deliver the capability we need. Risks and associated mitigation action are continually reviewed for all defence programmes. It would not be appropriate for the Ministry of Defence to release commercially sensitive material on any defence programme, as to do so would prejudice commercial interests.

All Written Answers – Ministry of Defence Police, Ministry of Defence, 19 January 2016

Julian Lewis Chair, Defence Committee
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, if he will make it his policy to ensure that (a) the armed policing of civilian-staffed MOD establishments will continue to be undertaken by units which are subject to civil police regulations, accountability and obligations and (b) such units will continue to be responsible for dealing with demonstrators at nuclear establishments.

Michael Fallon The Secretary of State for Defence
It is Defence policy to use the MOD Police (MDP) as part of security arrangements at establishments where there is an essential requirement for constabulary powers. An ability to deploy appropriate trained and equipped public order capability in response to spontaneous or pre-planned incidents or events remains a core task of the MDP.

All Written Answers – Nuclear Weapons, Ministry of Defence, 18 January 2016

Paul Flynn Labour, Newport West
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, with reference to the Answer of 19 December 2006 to an oral question from the former hon. Member for North Devon, on Nuclear Weapons, Official Report, column 1902W, what plan his Department has for ensuring an adequate supply of tritium to maintain the UK’s nuclear weapons’ capability until 2055; and what the projected cost of those plans is.

Philip Dunne Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Defence Procurement)
This information is being withheld for the purpose of safeguarding national security.

All Written Answers – Nuclear Weapons, Ministry of Defence, 18 January 2016

Paul Flynn Labour, Newport West
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, on what date the most recent stocktake between the UK and the US under the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement took place; where that meeting was held; what matters were discussed at that meeting; and where and when the next such meeting is scheduled to take place.

Philip Dunne Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Defence Procurement)
The last Stocktake meeting between the Government and US Administration under the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement took place at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, US on 18 March 2015. Matters discussed at this meeting included: review of actions and decisions; technical and programme updates; discussion of Strategic Collaborations; and planning 2015-16 activity. The next Stocktake meeting is scheduled to take place in London later this year.

All Written Answers – Radioactive Materials: Transport, Ministry of Defence, 18 January 2016

Paul Flynn Labour, Newport West
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, with reference to the reply of 17 March 2011, Official Report, column 514W, on radioactive materials transport, whether the practice of displaying radioactive materials hazard warning signs on vehicles carrying special nuclear materials will continue following the retirement from service of High Security Vehicles.

Philip Dunne Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Defence Procurement)
It is not current Ministry of Defence policy to display radioactive material hazard signs on the Truck Cargo Heavy Duty (TCHD) Mk3 when transporting special nuclear materials. Adequate safety arrangements, as required by legislation, are in place to ensure the necessary information is available to emergency services in the event of an incident.

All Written Answers – Nuclear Installations: Emergencies, Ministry of Defence, 15 January 2016

Paul Flynn Labour, Newport West
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what actions have been undertaken in response to finding reference TRF0195 of the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator’s assessment of the Astral Climb 12 nuclear emergency exercise; and on what dates each such action was closed out.

Philip Dunne Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Defence Procurement)
Finding TRF 195 from the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator’s assessment of Exercise Astral Climb 2012 called for documented arrangements to be reviewed and updated to reflect two changes in practice: the responsibility for the medical response and the monitoring instrumentation. This action was completed in August 2013. The finding also called for a review of Convoy and Station Nuclear Emergency Organisation Team response arrangements; this review was carried out in 2015.

All Written Answers – AWE: Regulation, Ministry of Defence, 15 January 2016

Paul Flynn Labour, Newport West
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what (a) enforcement action was taken and (b) warning letters were issue against the Atomic Weapons Establishment by regulatory authorities in 2014 and 2015; and which of those enforcement actions are ongoing.

Michael Fallon The Secretary of State for Defence
The Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) received a single Improvement Notice from the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) on 8 June 2015. This Improvement Notice remains open; the ONR and the AWE have agreed a set of actions that enable this to be closed by the due date of 30 September 2016.

No regulatory authority has taken enforcement action against the AWE in 2014 and 2015, and no warning letters have been issued.

All Written Answers – Nuclear Weapons, Ministry of Defence, 15 January 2016

Paul Flynn Labour, Newport West
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, on what date the decision was made not to proceed with developing a future theatre nuclear weapon (FTNW); and how much had been spent on (a) the vehicle element and (b) the warhead element of the FTNW programme up to that point.

Philip Dunne Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Defence Procurement)
On 18 October 1993, the then Secretary of State for Defence informed Parliament (Official Report, column 32): “we have concluded that our previous requirement for a new stand-off nuclear weapon capability is not a sufficiently high priority to justify the procurement of a new nuclear system in the current circumstances. Instead, we will plan, after the WE177 eventually leaves service in the long term, on exploiting the flexibility and capability of the Trident system to provide the vehicle for the delivery of our sub-strategic deterrent.”

Also on 19 July 1993 (HC Deb vol 229 cc83-4W), the then Minister for Defence Procurement provided the following information about expenditure to evaluate options for the Future Theatre Nuclear Weapon:

Expenditure to the end of March 1993 on studies of possible vehicles:

Year £
1989-90 928,518
1990-91 1,372,329
1991-92 1,870,285
1992-93 2,658,471

Information on costs incurred on the Future Theatre Nuclear Weapon warhead programme was withheld for reasons of national security. Those reasons no longer apply but this information is not held centrally and could be provided only at disproportionate cost.

Nuclear Weapons (Word Document, 16.74 KB)

All Written Answers – Trident, Ministry of Defence, 14 January 2016

Paul Flynn Labour, Newport West
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, when he plans to publish the UK’s Future Nuclear Deterrent: 2015 Update to Parliament.

Michael Fallon The Secretary of State for Defence
A further update will be published this year.

All Written Answers – Trident Submarines: Procurement, Ministry of Defence, 11 January 2016

John Woodcock Labour/Co-operative, Barrow and Furness
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, when his Department conducted its most recent review of the procurement process for the Successor submarines.

Philip Dunne Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Defence Procurement)
All Ministry of Defence programmes are routinely subject to regular review as part of the standard approvals and scrutiny process. The most recent review of the Successor programme was produced in December 2015.

All Written Answers -Trident Submarines: Lighting, Ministry of Defence, 11 January 2016

John Woodcock Labour/Co-operative, Barrow and Furness
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what process his Department followed in awarding the lighting contracts for the Successor submarines.

John Woodcock Labour/Co-operative, Barrow and Furness
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, for what reasons there was no bidding process for the primary lighting contract for the Successor submarines.

Philip Dunne Minister of State (Ministry of Defence) (Defence Procurement)
No contract has yet been awarded for the Successor primary lighting system.